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1 General Introduction
An intermediary is a third party that o¤ers intermediation services between sellers and
buyers or that purchases from suppliers and then resells to buyers.
Generally speaking, intermediaries can play many roles in a transaction whether it is
an international transaction or simply a domestic one. Spulber (1996, p.136) summarizes
four actions of intermediaries:"setting prices and clearing markets; providing liquidity and
immediacy; coordinating buyers and sellers; and guaranteeing quality and monitoring
performance." This dissertation aims at further enhancing our understanding of how
intermediaries can in di¤erent scenarios a¤ect suppliers behavior and what determines
their e¤ects on the economy and social welfare.
In principle, for any transaction involving intermediaries, there would be negotiations
between suppliers and intermediaries. The outcome of the negotiations are usually inu-
enced by the buyer power of intermediaries. Conversely when making optimal decisions,
the suppliers must be concerned about the buyer power of intermediaries. Consequently,
it is important to identify how the buyer power of intermediaries a¤ects supplier behav-
ior. In particularly, chapter 2 deals with the e¤ects on supplier incentives to invest in
innovation.
Depending on di¤erent model settings, a variety of theoretical ndings exists in the
recent theoretical literature. The common view is that a large intermediary is able
to obtain advantageous terms (e.g., price discounts) from their suppliers by exercising
buyer power. However, there is a wide variety of explanations for the e¤ects of buyer
power on the suppliers innovation. Actually when endogenizing the buyer power of
the intermediary, the previous theoretical models just consider a situation, in which
two buyers merge into one group. This simplies the analysis, however it neglects the
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competition between strong merged buyers and small independent buyers. Therefore,
chapter 2 proceeds by rst examining the competition between a big merged buyer and
small independent buyers, rather than focusing solely on a big merged buyer. The relative
status of a large buyer is given more attention in chapter 2. Eventually, chapter 2 shows
that there is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the buyer power of intermediaries
and supplier innovation.
In chapter 2, the main function of intermediaries is setting prices and clearing mar-
kets. In the following chapters 3 and 4, this dissertation highlights another function of
intermediaries, i.e. to ...hold inventories to provide liquidity or availability of goods and
services (see Spulber,1996, p.135).
In chapter 3, we1.1 focus on the intermediary in the context of international trade.
An intermediary could be located in the seller market (an export intermediary), in the
buyer market (an import intermediary), or involve an intermediary in both markets.
Specically, we are interested in the role of export and import intermediaries in allocating
inventories across countries and over time. We identify circumstances under which it
would pay a producer to use either an export or an import intermediary. Moreover, we
ask what e¤ects the presence of such an intermediary has on the volume and on the
volatility of trade, on the size of trade inventories, and on social welfare.
We show that it pays a manufacturer to sell through a wholesaler rather than ex-
port directly provided there is enough demand volatility. We also nd that an export
wholesaler has indeed an edge over an import wholesaler when demands across di¤erent
markets are negatively correlated, while an import wholesaler has an edge if this corre-
lation is positive. In addition, an important outcome of our model is the nding that
wholesalers essentially smooth trade and decrease the need to maintain large inventory.
As shown by Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2010a, p.2305), international trade is
often lumpy1.2. Therefore, we also pay attention to the trade lumpiness in chapter 3. As
a trade becomes lumpy; that is, international shipments become both larger when they
1.1This chapter is based on a paper that is joint work with Horst Ra¤ and Nicolas Schmitt.
1.2Using monthly data on the universe of US exports for goods in narrowly dened categories (ten-
digit Harmonized System code), Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan show that annual trade is highly
concentrated in a few months. The bulk of trade (85 percent) is accounted for by only three months of
the year; the top month of the year accounts for 50 percent of that years trade on average. No trade
is recorded in half of the months. The infrequency and high concentration of these trade ows in a few
months of the year reect the role of economies of scale in international trade.
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occur and possibly less regular. We show that it decreases the manufacturers incentives
to channel trade through a wholesaler, whether it is an import or an export wholesaler.
However, when a manufacturer still chooses to channel trade through a wholesaler, lumpy
trade makes the use of an import wholesaler much more desirable.
Finally in chapter 3, we introduce a more general model to identify su¢ cient con-
ditions under which intermediation may raise or lower the volume of trade and social
welfare. These social welfare results show that a manufacturers private incentive re-
garding the organization of international sales can be aligned with societys interests or
not.
In chapter 4, this dissertation will further focus on the issue of the volatility of trade,
which has been mentioned but not deeply investigated in chapter 3. Jay Forrester rst
introduced the denition of bullwhip e¤ect in 1961. He characterized it as an amplication
of demand variability from a downstream site to an upstream site. Since then, the
bullwhip e¤ect has been observed and recognized in a managerial context, as well as
in various companies and industries. For a long time, the bullwhip e¤ect has been an
operational management concept. There exists a massive amount of articles on this topic.
However, in most of the operational management literature, demand is characterized by
an exogenous process. An intermediary does not need to make an optimal pricing decision.
By assuming an exogenous demand process, it might be easy to measure the volatility of
demand in each echelon of the supply chain. It would, however, make readers lose sight
of how the intermediariesbehavior in a supply chain drives the dynamics of trade ows
and then causes the bullwhip e¤ect. On the other hand, some industries do not exhibit a
bullwhip e¤ect. By using industry-level U.S. data, Cachon, Randall et al. (2007, p.457)
nd "wholesale industries exhibit a bullwhip e¤ect, but retail industries generally do not
exhibit the e¤ect, nor do most manufacturing industries." To our knowledge, there is
no theoretical model in economics or operation management that attempts to give an
explanation for why some industries exhibit a bullwhip e¤ect while others do not. It is
then reasonable for us to investigate the underlying rationale.
Therefore, chapter 4 develops a new theoretical model of the bullwhip e¤ect, where the
intermediary makes optimal pricing and inventory management decisions. By introducing
a trade collapse case, which is ignored in previous literature, our model shows that there
will be a reverse bullwhip e¤ect if the persistence of demand shocks is small, and a
bullwhip e¤ect will be present when a large persistence of the demand shock exists. In
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addition, it is shown that the degree of the bullwhip e¤ect increases as the persistence
of demand shocks goes up. Therefore, this chapter provides a new explanation for why
some industries exhibit the bullwhip e¤ect while others do not.
4
2 Buyer Power of Intermediaries and Supplier In-
centives
Abstract: In this chapter, we develop a model to analyze the e¤ects of
buyer power on supplier incentives. It is shown that there is an inverted-U-
shaped relationship between the buyer power of intermediaries and supplier
innovation. We introduce the Nash Bargaining Solution to characterize the
process of negotiation between buyers and supplier. Rather than focusing
solely on a big merged buyer, we proceed by rst examining the competition
between a big merged buyer and small independent buyers. We also indicate
how the suppliers innovation inuences the buyers outside option as the
structure of the downstream market becomes more concentrated. Whether or
not one merger is powerful enough to weaken a suppliers innovation depends
on the relative size of the big merged buyer. Thus, when antitrust authorities
investigate a merger case, they should evaluate how much the merger would
a¤ect market structure.
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2.1 Introduction
In todays market, many industries are facing increasing downstream concentration. An
apparent example is the emergence of large retail chains, particularly in the fast-moving
consumer goods industry.2.1 Over the last several years, such concentration has drawn the
attention of economists and antitrust authorities, who are concerned about the e¤ect of
the retailersincreasing buyer power over their suppliers, and its e¤ects on the suppliers
incentives to innovate.
There are various ways to study the sources and e¤ects of buyer power. In general, a
supplier negotiates with downstream buyers, and the Nash Bargaining Solution is used
to characterize the negotiation process. The bargaining position or buyer power is thus
determined by the outside-option payo¤s. Economists usually model a process of down-
stream market concentration to endogenize the bargaining position, and then show how
the supplier makes the optimal decision for innovation. Depending on di¤erent model
settings, a variety of theoretical ndings exists in recent literature. The common view is
that a large buyer is able to obtain advantageous terms (e.g., price discounts) from their
suppliers by exercising buyer power. However, there is a wide variety of explanations for
the source of buyer power, and the most controversial issue is the e¤ects of buyer power
on the suppliers investment in innovation.
Mazarotto (2004) nds that retailers may get price discounts in negotiations with the
manufacturer if they merge locally, i.e., they merge with competing retailers. He also
nds that the suppliers response, when facing a merged buyer, is to reduce its e¤ort to
bring down the unit production cost. DeGraba (2003), Chae and Heidhues (2004) nd
that big buyers may receive discounts if the buyers and or suppliers are risk averse. Also,
the dynamic welfare e¤ects of big buyers will be negative because the suppliers incentives
to reduce his unit costs are weakened. Inderst and Wey (2003)s model shows the link
between the suppliers production technology choice and the presence of downstream
buyer power. This model demonstrates that a big buyer will obtain a discount if total
industry prot is strictly concave in the number of actives stores. Surprisingly, it shows
the dynamic welfare e¤ects are positive, the presence of large buyers may strengthen
2.1The concentration ratio of the ve largest retailer (C5) in member countries of the EU is on average
50% (IGD European Grocery Retailing, 2005). The UKs top four grocery retailers account for 65% of
total retail sales (the Competition Commission, 2008, p.29). In the US, C8 was 17.5% in 2007, instead of
15.3% in 2002. See the US census Bureau, Retail Trade http://www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html
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the suppliers incentives to switch to a technology with relatively high xed costs but
low unit costs (less convex). Inderst and Wey (2011) consider cross-border mergers with
assumptions of constant unit production costs and multiple downstream markets. They
nd a big buyers threat of integrating backwards to be more credible than the threat of
a small buyer. Hence, big buyers are more likely to receive discounts. Again, the welfare
e¤ects are found to be positive, the suppliers incentives to reduce its unit costs will
increase as the buyers grow larger. Inderst and sha¤er (2007) nd cross-border mergers
to be protable for retailers, because they can commit to stocking the same product at all
locations and therefore make the suppliers compete harder for the contracts. However,
since the merged buyers nd it protable to reduce the number of products supplied,
the welfare e¤ect is negative. Furthermore, the suppliers might nd it optimal to choose
ine¢ cient product characteristics when they face big buyers.
Interestingly, various case studies and empirical data studies contradict each other. A
US Federal Trade Commission (FTC 2000, p. 57) report states that when facing increas-
ingly powerful buyers, suppliers respond by under-investing in innovation or production.
In a European Commission (EC 1999, p. 4) report, buyer power may force manufactures
"to reduce investments in new products or product improvements, advertising and brand
building." Nevertheless, Iacovone et al. (2010), in a study of Wal-Mart in Mexico, show
that producers tend to invest more when facing a powerful buyer such as Wal-Mart. By
using a unique dataset containing 1,129 observations of German rms from manufactur-
ing and service sectors, Köhler and Rammer (2012, p.16) nd that "buyer power will
have a more positive e¤ect on suppliersinnovation incentives if price competition in the
downstream market is high."
We wonder, are the theories mentioned above missing something? When we consider
the buyer power issue, we should not only focus on the large buyer and supplier, but
also on the small independent buyers. The relative status of a large buyer should be
given more attention. Unfortunately, articles considering the role of this relative status
are rare.2.2
This chapter presents a theoretical model to show the non-monotonic e¤ects of buyer
2.2Although Inderst and Wey (2011) notice it, they just consider isolated markets. In each market,
there are two competing rms. This simplied assumption would make the e¤ect of a merger so limited,
it cannot characterize the case of an extremely powerful buyer. Moreover, this assumption ignores the
change of the market structure as the concentration increases.
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power on a suppliers innovation activities. There is one upstream supplier who can
decide whether or not to invest in innovation to reduce marginal costs. In the downstream
market, there are several competing buyers (or retailers) who negotiate with the supplier
about the price of goods that will nally be sold to consumers.
The suppliers innovation has the following e¤ects. At rst, given a certain degree
of market concentration, lower marginal costs will increase industry prots. This is nat-
urally good for both sides, buyers and supplier. Furthermore, a decrease in marginal
costs will make the buyersoutside option less valuable. In fact, if the negotiations with
one buyer break down, then the supplier can sell the lower-marginal-cost goods to his
rivals, and the competition the buyer faces will be much ercer.2.3However, as the market
concentration increases, the changes of the innovation e¤ect on both the supplier and
buyerssides are not easy to identify. The innovation e¤ect on total market prot in-
creases in the degree of market concentration, but the acceleration rate will be zero when
it becomes a monopoly market. This is the positive e¤ect for the supplier. The innova-
tion e¤ect on the large buyers outside option value is ambiguous as the market becomes
more concentrated. It depends on the relative status of independent buyers and large
buyer. In cases where the buyer is not so strong (large), the number of other independent
retailers is relatively large in this downstream market. This implies that the buyer will
face a more competitive market if the supplier sells the lower-marginal-cost goods to the
other unmerged independent buyers. When this not-so-strong buyer merges with another
independent retailer, the downstream market structure will not change dramatically, but
the not-so-strong buyers market share will increase substantially2.4. The change of inno-
vation e¤ect on the large buyers outside option value is mainly presented via the change
of the not-so-strong buyers market share. Then the e¤ect of cost reduction on a buyers
outside option value will increase as the not-so-strong buyer becomes larger. Neverthe-
less, when this buyer is strong (large), the result will be the opposite. In this case, the
downstream market structure experiences a dramatic change. The number of other inde-
pendent retailers becomes relatively small, thus the sales of the lower-marginal-cost goods
through these independent retailers do not have a great impact on the strong buyer. This
2.3Inderst and Wey (2011) have a similar discussion; a buyer that chooses to switch to another supplier
will be at an increased disadvantage vis-a-vis competing rms the more the supplier has invested to reduce
marginal costs.
2.4For instance, the number of stores the not-so-strong retailer owns increases from 1 to 2, his market
share increases roughly 100%.
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implies the innovation e¤ect becomes weaker as the market becomes more concentrated.
This chapter serves to provide antitrust authorities a diversity of perspectives on merger
cases. As such, antitrust authorities should consider the relative size of a merger, and
verify whether one merger is too powerful to stimulate suppliers innovation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model and
Section 2.3 analyzes the equilibria of the model. Section 2.4 examines the e¤ects of
buyer power on supplier incentives and gives the core results of this chapter. Section 2.5
provides a linear inverse demand function case. Section 2.6 concludes. All details about
proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
Consider an industry consisting only one upstream supplier. At the beginning, the sup-
plier can produce with an old technology at a marginal cost level c, and there is no
xed production cost. The supplier decides to invest in innovation in order to reduce the
marginal cost from c to c, which costs I = I (4c), 4c = c   c, I 0 > 0, I 00 > 0. After
innovation, the supplier can produce with the new technology at a marginal cost level c
and sell the products to the downstream market. We assume this new technology will be
protected by a patent, no one else can use this new technology.
In the downstream market, there are n identical stores. If m stores merge into one
group, we call it m-retailer. The other n m stores are independent, and each of them
can be considered as an independent retailer. Therefore there are n  m + 1 players in
the downstream market, denoted by retailer i, where
i = 1; 2; :::h; :::; n m| {z }
n m independent retailers
; n m+ 1| {z }
m-retailer
:
We label the m-retailer as retailer n   m + 1 and the independent retailers as retailer
1; 2; :::h; :::; n m. Each independent retailer has only one store, while the m-retailer has
m stores. For computational purposes, it is appropriate to consider m as a continuous
variable, although it only has an economic meaning when it is a natural number. We
assume here that m 2 [1; n]. Obviously, as m increases, the downstream market becomes
more concentrated; its structure changes as the m-retailer grows larger.
The supplier negotiates simultaneously with the n m+1 downstream retailers. They
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negotiate over two-part tari¤s ti = Fi + viqi, where vi is the wholesale price and Fi is
the xed fee paid by retailer i. If the negotiations with the m-retailer break down, the
m-retailer can invest, by paying a xed cost f , in using the old technology for its own
production; the marginal cost for the m-retailer in this case is equal to c. We also assume
for simplicity that an independent retailer is relatively small, it cannot a¤ord the xed
cost f to produce itself. If the negotiations with an independent retailer break down,
there is no outside option for the independent retailer. This implies that only the m-
retailer has an outside option during the process of negotiation. For convenience, here
we consider a situation, in which when a retailer i does not sign a contract with the
supplier, the other retailers still sign the contract at the anticipated equilibrium level.
This means we assume non-contingent contracts among supplier and retailers. In this
case, each retailer i will pay the "all-buyers-active" equilibrium2.5 xed fees, even if the
suppliers negotiation with another retailer breaks down.
Cournot competition among these n m+ 1 retailers occurs in the nal market, i.e.
these n stores sell products to nal consumers by the inverse demand function:
P = P (Q) = P
 X
i
Qi
!
(2.1)
= P
 
n mX
i=1
Qi +Qn m+1
!
= P
 
n mX
i=1
Qi +
mX
j=1
Qn m+1;j
!
where Qn m+1;j is quantity of product sold by each store in the m-retailer.
In order to investigate this model further, we need to make the following standard
assumptions:
A1: P 0 (Q) < 0.
A2: P 0 (Q) +QP 00 (Q) < 0
This means that each downstream rms reaction curve slopes downward. Equiva-
lently, an increase in its rivalsoutput lowers rm is marginal revenue.
2.5"all-buyers-active" equilibrium means that each retailer signs a contract with the supplier.
10
A3: 0  2P 00 (Q) +QP 000 (Q)  Q[P 00(Q)]2
P 0(Q) + P
00 (Q)
Here 0  2P 00 (Q) + QP 000 (Q) means the marginal e¤ect mentioned in A2 weakly
decreases in Q, and 2P 00 (Q) +QP 000 (Q)  Q[P 00(Q)]2
P 0(Q) + P
00 (Q) has no economic meaning,
it just makes the calculation more tractable. Mathematically, it means the convexity (or
the elasticity of the slope) of the inverse demand function weakly decreases in Q. We will
give an example to show that these assumptions are reasonable.
A4: A unique Cournot equilibrium exists.
A5: All rms have positive market shares at the Cournot equilibrium.
The overall strategic interaction between supplier and retailers can be represented
by the following sequential game: in stage 1, the supplier decide how much to invest
in innovation in order to reduce the marginal cost. In stage 2, the supplier negotiates
simultaneously with the n  m + 1 downstream retailers over two-part tari¤s. In stage
3, each retailer decides how much to purchase from the supplier, and then resells to the
nal market, where the Cournot competition occurs.
2.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the equilibria of the sequential game and derive the
suppliers optimal decision of 4c. Solving the game backwards, we begin with the
Cournot competition in the nal market at stage 3, and then move to the process of
negotiation at stage 2. We then turn to the suppliers maximization problem at stage 1.
2.3.1 Stage 3: Cournot competition
Here we analyze the game backward, starting at stage 3. Given the wholesale price
vn m+1, the maximization problem for the m-retailer is
max
Qn m+1;j
mX
j=1
Qn m+1;j [P (Q)  vn m+1]
Since the n downstream stores are identical, we can use symmetry with the maximization
problem and write the rst order condition as:
P (Q)  vn m+1 +mQmP 0 (Q) = 0 (2.2)
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Qm is the optimal quantity for each store of the m-retailer.
Given the wholesale price vi for independent retailer i = 1; 2; :::; n m, the maximiza-
tion problem is
max
Qi
Qi [P (Q)  vi]
The rst order condition is
QiP
0 (Q) + P (Q)  vi = 0 (2.3)
By using the fact that
n mX
i=1
Qi +mQm = Q and equations (2.2) and (2.3), we have
(n m+ 1)P (Q) +QP 0 (Q)  vn m+1  
n mX
i=1
vi = 0 (2.4)
Therefore, the aggregate market quantity in Cournot equilibrium is determined by equa-
tion (2.4).
2.3.2 Stage 2: Bargaining Solution
In this subsection, we use the Nash Bargaining Solution method to characterize the
process of negotiation. In order to avoid double marginalization, we have assumed that
the players negotiate over two-part tari¤s. In equilibrium, the players then set the whole-
sale prices equal to marginal cost, i.e. vi = c. The bargain problems reduces to split the
realized surplus through the xed transfer Fi.
We write the Nash Bargaining Solution to the bargaining problem of the m-retailer
and the supplier as
Fn m+1 = arg max
Fn m+1
 
n m+1   Fn m+1   outn m+1
 
Fn m+1 +
n mX
i=1
Fi  
n mX
i=1
F di
!
(2.5)
Fn m+1 is the xed transfer that the supplier can receive from the m-retailer. n m+1
is the total operating prot of the m-retailers stores. outn m+1 is the outside option value
for the m-retailer. If the negotiations with the m-retailer break down, the m-retailer can
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invest, by paying a xed cost f , in using the old technology for its own production;
the marginal cost for m-retailer in this case is equal to c. However the other n   m
independent retailers can continue buying products from the supplier at wholesale price
c.
n mP
i=1
Fi is the total transfer that the supplier can receive from the n m independent
retailers.
n mP
i=1
F di is the disagreement point of the independent retailers. Since we have
assumed non-contingent contracts and the "all-buyers-active" equilibrium, we know that
n mP
i=1
Fi =
n mP
i=1
F di . Solving this bargaining problem above, we have
Fn m+1 =
n m+1   outn m+1
2
(2.6)
We have assumed that there is no outside option for an independent retailer. Similarly
we have
Fi =
i
2
;8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n m
In order to know the value of outn m+1, we need to calculate the so-called outside
equilibrium. In fact, this conceptual equilibrium plays a very important role in the
process of bargaining. The suppliers innovation inuences the bargaining positions of
both sides through outn m+1. In this conceptual equilibrium, we denote the optimal output
for each store of the m-retailer by Qoutm , and the aggregate market quantity by Q
out. From
equation (2:2) and (2:4), Qoutm ; Q
out are determined by:
P
 
Qout
  c+mQoutm P 0  Qout = 0 (2.7)
(n m+ 1)P  Qout+QoutP 0  Qout  c  (n m) (c 4c) = 0 (2.8)
then the outside option value for the m-retailer is
outn m+1 = mQ
out
m
 
P
 
Qout
  c  f
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2.3.3 Stage 1: Suppliers Problem
The total revenue which the supplier receives from n m+ 1 downstream retailers is
n m+1   outn m+1
2
+
1
2
n mX
i=1
i =
1
2
" X
i
i
!
  outn m+1
#
the suppliers maximization problem can thus be written as:
max
4c
1
2
" X
i
i
!
  outn m+1
#
  I (4c) (2.9)
Solving this maximization problem, we can obtain this optimal solution 4c. We then
nish the analysis of this sequential game.
2.4 The E¤ects of Buyer Power on Supplier Incentives
The main contribution of this chapter is to show that the optimal solution 4c is not
monotonic as m increases. In order to do this, it is necessary to prove that the rst order
derivative of
 X
i
i
!
  outn m+1 with respect to 4c is a non-monotonic function of m.
In fact,
X
i
i is the total prot in the downstream market, we denote it by . Then we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Under Assumptions A1-A5, we have
@
@4c = Q

2P 0 (Q) +QP 00 (Q)
(n m+ 2)P 0 (Q) +QP 00 (Q)

> 0
and
@outn m+1
@4c =  
(n m)mQoutm [mQoutm P 00 (Qout) + 2P 0 (Qout)]
(n m+ 2)P 0 (Qout) +QoutP 00 (Qout) < 0
Proof. see Appendix.
Proposition 2.1 means that innovation would make the total prot in this industry
larger. On the other hand, innovation will weaken the outside option value for the m-
retailer, which follows our intuition. This can be easily explained: when the negotiation
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with the m-retailer breaks down, the wholesale price for the independent retailers is lower
than the m-retailers marginal cost. Proposition 2.1 directly shows that
@
@4c
" X
i
i
!
  outn m+1
#
> 0
This implies that innovation will increase the total revenue which the supplier receives.
Consequently from (2:9), we can understand the trade-o¤ between total innovation ben-
ets and their cost.
From now on, we write E (Q) =  QP 00(Q)
P 0(Q) for the elasticity of the slope of the inverse
demand curve. Mathematically, E (Q) is the convexity of the inverse demand function.
From A2, E (Q) < 1.
Lemma 2.1 Under Assumptions A1-A3, we have E 0 (Q)  0.
Proof.
E 0 (Q) =
 P 0 (Q) [P 00 (Q) +QP 000 (Q)] +Q [P 00 (Q)]2
[P 0 (Q)]2
From A1-A3, we can have the following properties,
) 2P 00 (Q) +QP 000 (Q)  Q [P
00 (Q)]2
P 0 (Q)
+ P 00 (Q)
)  P 0 (Q) [P 00 (Q) +QP 000 (Q)] +Q [P 00 (Q)]2  0
) E 0 (Q)  0:
If we write sm =
mQoutm
Qout
for the m-retailers market share in the conceptual outside
equilibrium, we get
@
@4c = Q

2  E (Q)
(n m+ 2)  E (Q)


=  (2.10)
 @
out
n m+1
@4c =
(n m) smQout [2  smE (Qout)]
[(n m+ 2)  E (Qout)]

=  (2.11)
Then
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@
 
   outn m+1

@4c = + 

= 
 (2.12)
From Proposition 2.1 , we know  > 0,  > 0, for 8 m  n.
Lemma 2.2 Under Assumptions A1-A5, if n > 3, then we have @
@m
> 0 for any m,
lim
m!1
@
@m
> 0; and lim
m!n
@
@m
= 0, lim
m!n
@
@m
=  Qout < 0. Thus the following claim holds:
lim
m!1
@

@m
> 0, lim
m!n
@

@m
< 0, if n > 3 (2.13)
Proof. see Appendix.
One key result from Lemma 2.2 is that the innovation e¤ect on the m-retailers outside
option, , is a non-monotonic function of m. In order to see the reasoning behind it2.6,
we write
@ log 
@m
=
0

=
@
@m
log sm +
@
@m
log (n m)
+
@
@m
logQout +
@
@m
log

2  smE
 
Qout

  @
@m
log

(n m+ 2)  E  Qout
In the case that the m-retailer is not as powerful (m is close to 1 and n is large
enough), the rate of change in the m-retailers market share sm will be an absolutely
large positive value, as the number of merged stores increases from m to m+1. However,
the structure of the downstream market does not change much, since the m-retailer
is relatively weak in this market. This implies that the terms log (n m), logQout and
log [(n m+ 2)  E (Qout)], which are determined by the structure of the market, do not
experience a large rate of change. For the term 2 smE (Qout), we know that E (Qout) < 1
and the value of sm would be small, then 2   smE (Qout) does not have a large rate of
change either. The positive rate of change in sm would dominate the sum of all the other
terms. That means the value of 
0

> 0, therefore the innovation e¤ect on m-retailers
outside option increases in m, if m-retailer is not powerful. However, in the case that the
m-retailer is very powerful in the downstream market (m is close to n), the negative rate
2.6In this chapter, we just wish to nd some su¢ cient conditions to illustrate this analysis. Therefore
we do not consider the case in which E0 (Q) > 0. It will take plenty of non-economic trivial calculations.
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of change2.7 in n m would dominate the sum of all the other terms, so that the value
of 
0

is negative. Hence, the innovation e¤ect on the m-retailers outside option decreases
in m, if m-retailer is extremely powerful.
The other results @
@m
> 0 and lim
m!n
@
@m
= 0 in Lemma 2.2 are also very interesting.
They are related to the issue of "market concentration and innovation". We nd that the
innovation e¤ect on total market prot increases in the degree of market concentration,
but the acceleration rate will be zero when it becomes a monopoly market.
In sum, Lemma 2.2 shows that the total innovation e¤ect on suppliers prot is a
non-monotonic function of m. With the assumption I 00 > 0, the optimal solution M c is
not monotonic as m increases. Thus, we immediately have the next proposition.
Proposition 2.2 There is a non-monotonic relationship between buyer power of inter-
mediaries and supplier innovation. More specically, (i) a larger buyer will have a positive
e¤ect on the suppliers innovation incentive if the downstream market is less concentrated,
(ii) while a larger buyer will negatively a¤ect a suppliers innovation incentive if the down-
stream market is extremely concentrated.
Proposition 2.2 provides antitrust authorities multiple perspectives on merger cases.
Antitrust authorities should consider the relative size of merger, and verify whether one
merger is too powerful to stimulate a suppliers innovation. Meanwhile, the rst part of
our results is consistent with the empirical ndings in Christian Köhler and Christian
Rammer (2012). In other words, when the antitrust authorities evaluate a proposed
merger, they should investigate whether it dramatically changes the structure of market.
2.5 Example: Linear Inverse Demand Function
In this section, we will use a linear inverse demand function to investigate this issue.
Although Proposition 2.2 shows a non-monotonic e¤ect of buyer power on suppliers
incentive, we still have no global insights about what happens when m increases from
1 to n. One mathematical reason is that we need further assumptions of fourth order
derivatives of the inverse demand function. Fortunately, if we focus on those inverse
2.7 for instance, a change from 2 to 1, or 1 to 0.
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demand functions which are usually used in economics, the buyer power e¤ect on the
supplier can be explicitly demonstrated.
Here we assume P = 1 Q, I (4c) = 
2
(c  c)2,  > 1
4
. From (2:4), we have
Q =
(1 + n m)  vn m+1  
n mX
i=1
vi
2 + n m
Then from (2:2) and (2:3)
Qm =
(1 + n m) (1  vn m+1) 
n mX
i=1
vi
m (2 + n m)
Qi =
2 (1  vi)  (1  vn m+1)
2 + n m ; i = 1; 2; :::; n m
Notice that in equilibrium vi = vn m+1 = c   4c, but in the conceptual "outside"
equilibrium vi = c 4c, for i = 1; 2; :::; n m; while vn m+1 = c.
The total prot of the m-retailer is
n m+1 = mQm (1 Q  vn m+1) = (mQm)2
=
266664
(1 + n m) (1  vn m+1) 
n mX
i=1
vi
2 + n m
377775
2

vi=vn m+1=c 4c
=

1  c+4c
2 + n m
2
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and the outside option yields prot
outn m+1 =
266664
(1 + n m) (1  vn m+1) 
n mX
i=1
vi
2 + n m
377775
2
  f
=

(1 + n m) (1  c)  (n m) (1  c+4c)
2 + n m
2
  f
=

(1  c)  (n m)4c
2 + n m
2
  f
where vi = c 4c, for i = 1; 2; :::; n m; and vn m+1 = c.
The prot for each independent store i = 1; 2; :::; n m is
i = Qi (1 Q  vi) = (Qi)2
=

2 (1  vi)  (1  vn m+1)
2 + n m
2
vi=vn m+1=c 4c
=

1  c+4c
2 + n m
2
Easily we can have that the total prot  = (1 + n m)  1 c+4c
2+n m
2
, then Proposition 2.1
can be demonstrated in the following two inequalities:
@
@4c =
2 (1 + n m)
(2 + n m)2 (1  c+4c) > 0
and
@outn m+1
@4c =  
2 (n m)
(2 + n m)2 [(1  c)  (n m)4c] < 0
The suppliers problem can be written as
max
4c
n m+1   outn m+1
2
+
(n m) i
2
  I (4c)
where I (4c) = 
2
(4c)2. The rst order condition is
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(n m+ 1)

1  c+4c
2 + n m

1
2 + n m

 

(1  c)  (n m)4c
2 + n m

  n m
2 + n m

  4c = 0
)4c = 2 (n m) + 1
( + 1) (n m)2 + (4   1) (n m+ 1) (1  c)
:
=  (m) (1  c)
Then we just need to observe the function  (m) to understand the properties of optimal
solution 4c.
0 (m) =
2 ( + 1)

(n m)2 + (n m)  (4   1)
( + 1) (n m)2 + (4   1) (n m+ 1)2
Therefore, lim
m!1
0 (m) > 0, lim
m!n
0 (m) < 0. It implies that Proposition 2.2 holds in this
linear demand function case. The expression of 0 (m) also shows that 0 (m) > 0, if
m  n  1; and 0 (m) < 0, if m = n. Therefore, in the case of a linear inverse demand
function, the optimal investment in cost reduction will fall after rise, as the degree of
market concentration increases.
To illustrate our results graphically, we set the key parameter values in the calibration
as follows: n = 3;  = 6.
0 1 2 3
0.040
0.045
0.050
0.055
0.060
m
phi
Figure 2.1: A non-monotonic e¤ect of buyer power
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter studies the impact of buyer power on a suppliers incentive to innovate.
Rather than focusing only on big merged buyers, we start by examining competition
among big a merged buyer and small independent buyers. If a merger cannot change
the market structure dramatically, it will have a positive e¤ect on a suppliers innovation
incentive; while a merger will negatively a¤ect suppliers innovation if it changes the mar-
ket structure fundamentally. The buyers outside option plays a critical role through our
analysis. Unlike the other existing papers which simply assume that two rms or stores
merge into one, our model explores a gradual transformation in the market structure.
Therefore, antitrust authorities can have a diversity of perspectives on horizontal merger
control.
In this chapter, we focus on innovation for the purpose of reducing marginal cost.
There may be other types of innovation, for instance, quality improvement or the de-
velopment of new products. We do not claim that our results can be applied in those
two cases. How buyer power a¤ects these two incentives is still open for consideration.
Nevertheless, it is important to study the relative status of independent buyers and the
large buyer.
Finally, there is only one supplier in our model. Is our result still valid in the case
of the multiple suppliers? Furthermore, if we use a cooperative game setting instead of
Nash Bargaining to revisit this issue, can we get some more fruitful results? All of these
questions are worthy of further research.
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3 Inventories and International Trade Volatility: The
Role of Export and Import Wholesalers
Abstract:3.1 The chapter develops a simple theoretical model to exam-
ine the role of export and import wholesalers in allocating inventories across
countries and over time. Selling internationally through export- and import-
wholesalers is shown to be benecial when demand volatility is high as whole-
salers smooth trade and lower inventory levels with respect to direct manu-
facturing exports. When trade becomes lumpy, we show that the incentives
to use intermediaries in general and export-wholesalers in particular are less-
ened. In addition, depending on product characteristics and trade lumpiness,
the use of wholesalers within a distribution supply chain may raise or lower
the volume of international trade and social welfare in the destination market.
3.1This chapter is based on a paper that is joint work with Horst Ra¤ and Nicolas Schmitt.
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3.1 Introduction
Intermediaries have played an active role in international trade throughout history. Even
with todays technologies that facilitate international contacts between buyers and sellers,
intermediaries continue to take care of a signicant share of transactions across national
boundaries in all countries and for most products.3.2
In principle, for any international transaction involving an intermediary, this interme-
diary could be located in the seller market (an export intermediary), in the buyer market
(an import intermediary), or involve an intermediary in both markets. The task of this
chapter is to identify circumstances under which it would pay a producer to use either
an export or an import intermediary. Moreover, we ask what e¤ects the presence of such
an intermediary has on the volume and on the volatility of trade, on the size of trade
inventories, and on social welfare.
In this chapter, we dene an intermediary as a wholesaler who has title to a product
and who buys and sells it on his own behalf earning a trade margin in the process. We
ignore ownership issues, and thus a wholesaler can be part of a vertically integrated
rm such as a manufacturer supplying its own wholesale services, or a retailer who has
integrated backward into wholesaling , or be an independent merchant dealing at arms
length with upstream and downstream rms (see Kleinert and Toubal, 2013 on this issue).
The literature has established that, in general, wholesalers can play many di¤erent
roles in a transaction. They range from allocating goods, providing price and product in-
formation, certifying product quality to managing inventory (Spulber, 1999). Depending
on the circumstances, each of these roles can be important for any transaction whether
it is an international or a domestic transaction. In this chapter, we seek advantages for
wholesalers relative to direct exchange that are directly connected to two specic charac-
teristics of international markets. First, buyers (whether wholesalers or other downstream
customers) place orders and the producer delivers the goods before the state of the de-
mand is known. Hence, we are interested in international markets characterized by (i)
a signicant lag between production and consumption, and (ii) uncertainty regarding
the state of the demand. Second, international trade also often involves a delivery lag
3.2In Canada for instance, the average share of wholesale trade (NAICS code 41) was 35.2% of the
value of imports and 12.7% of the value of exports over the period 1998-2001. This share was 68.4% for
imports of Apparel, and 49.4% for exports of farm products (without grain) (Hays, 2005).
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(international transportation typically takes time) and is often lumpy.3.3 As shown by
Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2010a), these two features matter a great deal for
international trade. Moreover, each of them leads to the existence of inventory. Obvi-
ously someone must hold inventories (at least for storable products) when there are lags
between production and consumption. In this chapter, the candidates for holding inven-
tories are import wholesalers, export wholesalers, or else, when manufacturers directly
exports their products, downstream rms in the destination market, such as retailers.
Two short examples may be useful to illustrate these cases. At the end of the 1990s,
the US toy market represented nearly half of the world toy market, and it was dominated
by two large rms (Mattel and Hasbro) whose production had largely moved to Asia
because of low production costs. Moving production far from consumers was not without
loss of exibility in managing supply as production quantities had to be specied months
before the holiday season and there were long transit times, custom delays, quota re-
strictions, and communication barriers [making] managing the supply of product owing
from Asia a challenge(Johnson, 2001, p. 118). Moreover, the demand for toys is charac-
terized by a heavy concentration of sales in November and December (45% of US annual
sales during that time; Johnson, 2001), a very uncertain success rate as very few toys are
typically successful during the Christmas season, and a heavy emphasis on new toys as
the most successful ones are rarely so over multiple years. Clearly, these features call less
for an emphasis on inventory management across sales periods than for an allocation of
inventories across markets to make sure that supply meets demand in each of them. This
is precisely what the main toy manufacturers put in place: large wholesaling facilities
able to divert products to Europe or the US depending on inventory needs(Johnson, p.
120). This example is best associated with the type of export-wholesaling activity that
we have in mind in this chapter.
On the import-wholesaling side, consider the case of ONeill Inc., a US manufacturer
3.3The World Bank (see www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/ trading-across-borders) nds
that the combination of container ocean shipping and administrative border requirements leads to an
average delivery lag of 10-11 days for exports from and imports to high income OECD countries and
a lag of 31-37 days for exports from and imports to South Asian or Sub-Sahara African countries. See
also Hummels and Schaur (2013). Arguments have been made that the recent economic crisis has led
nancially-strapped ocean carriers to cut fuel costs by reducing vessel speeds from 25 to 22 knots, which
adds up to three days to the 11-12 days voyage between Asia and North America, for instance (Bonney
and Leach, 2010). Crista, et al. (2012) show that ocean shipping is used for 50.2% of world international
trade (values), ranging from 28.3% of North American exports to 89.8% of exports from Oceania.
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of apparel and accessories for water sports. It also manufactures its products in Asia and
like for toys, the lead time for production is long (3 months) also forcing this manufacturer
to produce well before the selling season. But it allows for two types of orders from US
retailers (Cachon, 2004): one placed well before the selling season (with pre-book discount
and delivery guarantee) in which case the retailers manage inventories and bear the risks
associated with demand uncertainty; a case of direct exportsin our terminology. The
other type of order can be made on short notice and is honored provided inventory is
available in its distribution centre in San Diego. In this case, it is the wholesaling unit
which acts as an importer, manages inventories and bears the risk.
This chapter is thus concerned with the role of wholesalers in managing inventory
and, specically, in allocating inventory across markets and across time. We want to
identify an advantage for wholesalers in managing inventory relative to downstream rms,
say retailers or downstream producers who in principle could also manage inventory.3.4
Following the market microstructure literature (Spulber, 1999), our theory of wholesaling
is built on the assumption that wholesalers possess market power.3.5 In fact, we show
that market power creates a role for wholesalers in managing inventories even if they do
not possess a superior technology relative to downstream rms.
Specically, the benets to producers of using a wholesaler to manage inventories
come from the intermediarys ability to adjust prices once the demand has been revealed
(price delegation) and from the fact that the intermediary may have better incentives than
downstream rms to allocate goods across markets and across time. In turn whether a
manufacturer sells directly to foreign buyers or delegates this task to an import or to an
export wholesaler inuences the size of these inventories and the volume as well as the
volatility of international trade.
We develop our results in a model in which a manufacturer may choose to export
directly to competitive downstream rms operating in di¤erent countries and across sev-
eral time periods, knowing that these rms may not sell the entire order they place in
3.4Inventories could, of course, also be held by producers. However, for goods that need to be produced
before demand is known, it is more di¢ cult to justify why a producer should rely exclusively on its
inventory once the demand is realized. Thus we make a distinction between production and sales but
this does not mean we are imposing any particular restriction on the ownership of these two activities.
3.5Spulber (1999, p. xvii) argues that any market microstructure theory requires intermediaries to
have at least some market power so that they can set prices and balance supply and demand across time.
Providing "immediacy services", that is, standing ready to buy and sell goods at di¤erent points in time
is seen as a key role of wholesalers, comparable to that of market makers in nancial markets.
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a given period and thus may keep the unsold portion of their order as inventory for the
following period. Alternatively a manufacturer may want to sell to an export wholesaler
who then dispatches the goods he has ordered to di¤erent destination markets by selling
to downstream rms, or else to an import wholesaler located in each destination market
who then manages inventories himself rather than letting the downstream rms do it.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. In a rst step, we show that in a simple model
with linear demand and additive demand uncertainty it pays a manufacturer to sell
through a wholesaler rather than export directly provided there is enough demand volatil-
ity. This is not an entirely surprising result insofar as, unlike the manufacturer, a whole-
saler is able to adjust wholesale prices and shipments to downstream rms after having
learned about the state of the demand even if he takes possession of his order before
demand is known. Although using a wholesaler is costly, the wholesalers informational
advantage over the manufacturer is more evident the more volatile the demand is. But
this is not enough in itself. The advantage of an import wholesaler over downstream
rms is also to behave in a way which is well aligned with the manufacturers incentives
regarding how, in each period, it determines what volume of goods should be sold and
thus dispatched to the downstream rms. This is because an import wholesaler faces a
downward sloping demand and not, like competitive downstream rms, a perfectly elastic
demand.
The advantage of an export wholesaler is similar except that an export wholesaler is
particularly well positioned to dispatch products to di¤erent destination markets in every
period and thus to take advantage of possible di¤erences in demands across destination
markets. We nd that an export wholesaler has indeed an edge over an import whole-
saler when demands across di¤erent markets are negatively correlated, while an import
wholesaler has an edge if this correlation is positive. In other words it pays to use an
export wholesaler when there is an opportunity for spatial arbitrage.
Critically, although in our simple version of the model, the total volume of trade is
for all intent and purpose the same whether wholesalers are involved or not, the main
impact of wholesalers is to decrease both trade volatility and inventory size with respect
to the case where the manufacturer sells directly to foreign downstream rms. Hence, an
important outcome of our model is the nding that wholesalers essentially smooth trade
and decrease the need to maintain large inventories.
In a second step we introduce an international trade lag that comes on top of the
26
production lag. In other words, suppose that by itself international trade takes time.
Not surprisingly this forces anyone receiving import shipments, whether the downstream
rms or import wholesalers, to hold larger inventories simply because trade shipments
need to cover more than one sales period. As a result trade becomes lumpy; that is,
international shipments become both larger when they occur and possibly less regular.
More importantly for our purpose, lumpy trade has implications for the manufacturers
choice of foreign trade partners. We show that it decreases the manufacturers incentives
to channel trade through a wholesaler, whether it is an import or an export wholesaler.
However, when a manufacturer still chooses to channel trade through a wholesaler, lumpy
trade makes the use of an import wholesaler much more desirable.
Both results come from the same source: shipments needed to cover multiple sales
periods necessarily reduce a wholesalers relative advantage to exploit information about
demands, whether this wholesaler imports or exports. However this is particularly prob-
lematic for an export wholesaler because, unlike an import wholesaler, lumpy trade forces
an export wholesaler to let the downstream rms play an active role in the management
of inventories. This is not desirable from the manufacturers point of view. Thus, with
lumpy trade, it is the import wholesalers ability to retain control of the management of
inventories that makes it particularly valuable to the manufacturer.
Clearly, our simple model with linear demands and additive demand uncertainty pro-
duces interesting results not only about the general role of wholesalers in international
trade, but especially about the di¤erent roles of import and export wholesalers. But
it does not produce very interesting welfare results. This is because, regardless of the
channel of international trade, the total expected volume of trade remains essentially the
same.
In a third step we therefore generalize the model in order to evaluate the e¤ect of
import wholesalers on the volume of trade and social welfare. There are two ways to
address these issues: one is to keep the same type of demand uncertainty (additive)
and to consider more general demands. The other is to consider multiplicative demand
uncertainty. In the rst case, we derive su¢ cient conditions regarding demand under
which an import wholesaler reduces expected social welfare in the destination countries
when trade is non-lumpy. Essentially under these conditions total trade is lower when
import wholesalers are involved than when they are not. Interestingly, when trade is
lumpy the same conditions produce the opposite result: the expected trade volume and
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social welfare rise with import wholesalers relative to direct trade.
In the second case, multiplicative demand uncertainty can be viewed as uncertainty
about consumerswillingness to pay. Thus there is uncertainty about consumers tastes
and about the distribution of tastes across markets. In this case, we show that linear
demand is a su¢ cient condition for social welfare to decrease with the presence of an
import wholesaler even if trade is lumpy.
These social welfare results show that, depending on the type of product that is
traded (which depends on the type of demand and on the source of the uncertainty), a
manufacturers private incentive regarding the organization of international sales can be
aligned with societys interests or not. In our model, this reects an important trade-o¤
associated with intermediation between improving the allocation of goods and inventories
across markets or time and generating ine¢ ciencies through market power.
It should be clear that the type of wholesalers we are dealing with in this chapter
are merchants, not agents or brokers, as they own the product they trade and manage
inventories. Obviously intermediaries have other important roles to play in international
markets other than managing inventory. Search and matching are obvious ones (see
Antras and Costinot, 2011; Blum, Claro and Horstmann, 2012). However, search and
matching do not require the presence of merchants and thus of intermediaries owning the
products and managing inventories. Indeed being an agent or a broker would su¢ ce. It
is why search and matching are not part of our model.
There is now evidence that inventories, whoever holds them, are larger for products
that are traded internationally and that they strongly inuence the dynamics of interna-
tional trade ows. Alessandria et al. (2010a), for instance, report detailed observations
analyzed by Hall and Rust (2000) regarding a US wholesaler buying and selling 2200
products in the steel industry.3.6 They report that, on average, international orders tend
to be about 50 percent larger and occur nearly half as frequently as domestic orders(p.
2310). This has a direct impact on the level of inventories which are larger for foreign
products than for domestic ones. These observations are very much consistent with the
presence of lags and lumpy shipments associated with international trade and with the
role of wholesalers in providing immediacy services.
3.6There were about 5000 wholesalers in the US in this industry in 1998-99 holding 7-8 million tons of
steel as inventory and shipping 29 million tons out of the 127 million tons of steel consumed in the US
making these rms the largest customer group of the steel mills (Hall and Rust, 2000, p175).
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Intermediariesinventory decisions are critically important for the understanding of
the dynamics of international trade ows. Altomonte et al. (2012) argue that inventory
decisions within international supply chains that include a manufacturer, a wholesaler
and foreign retailers, are key to understand the trade dynamics during the great trade
collapse of 2008-09 and subsequent recovery.3.7 They claim in particular that rapid trade
collapses and recoveries can, on average, be associated with a supply chain belonging to
a multinational and its a¢ liates. This is because having a common ow of information
about the state of nal demand allows for lower levels of inventory at each link along the
supply chain with respect to those where rms deal at arms length. In this last case, the
so-called bullwhip e¤ect(Forrester, 1961) is more likely to occur leading demand shocks
at the consumer level to translate into greater demand variability and larger inventories
as one moves upstream within the supply chain.
One interpretation of our results is that the extent of a supply chain, that is how many
links it has between production and consumption, does inuence trade ows and their
timing because it will inuence who manages inventories and this in itself has an impact
on the dynamics of international trade ows irrespective of the ownership structure of a
supply chain.
To our knowledge, there is no paper in international trade attempting to distinguish
export and import wholesalers. There is, however, a recent and rapidly growing literature
on intermediation in international trade.3.8 This literature has focused its attention on
three di¤erent aspects of intermediation. First, there is a literature providing evidence
on the importance of intermediation in international markets. This is the case for the US
(Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2009; Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott, 2010a, 2010b),
for Italy (Bernard, Grazzi and Tomasi, 2011), for Chile (Blum, Claro and Horstmann,
2010) and for Hong Kong (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004) among others. Second, there
is a literature investigating direct versus indirect exports (Ahn, Khandelwal and Wei,
2011; Akerman, 2011; Blum, Claro and Horstmann, 2012; Crozet, Lalanne and Poncet,
2013; Felbermayr and Jung, 2011; Krautheim, 2013; Schroeder, Trabold and Trueswetter,
3.7See also Alessandria et al. (2010b) on the great trade collapse and inventories.
3.8There is also a recent literature placing a large emphasis on the role of inventories to explain
international trade ows, such as during the great trade collapse, and showing that importers hold
more inventories stocks than non-importers (Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan, 2014, 2011, 2010a,b;
Altomonte et al., 2012). Although intermediaries play a role in this literature, they are not the primary
focus.
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2005 among others). These papers typically assume that intermediaries are located in
the export market.3.9 Third, there is a literature where producers have no choice but
must use intermediaries to reach consumers. The location of these intermediaries is also
generally taken as given (Antras and Costinot, 2011; Ra¤ and Schmitt, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2009, 2012, 2013).3.10
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present a simple model featuring
linear demand and additive demand shocks. In Section 3.3 we solve for the equilibrium
of this model assuming that there is a time lag between production and consumption but
no time lag in trade. We study the role of import and export wholesalers and examine
the connection between inventories and the volatility of international trade. We also
show how intermediaries may reduce trade volatility. In Section 3.4 we examine how the
equilibrium of this simple model changes when, in addition to a production lag, we have
a trade lag and lumpy trade. In particular, we show how trade lumpiness a¤ects the
relative merits of import and export wholesalers and the merit of intermediation itself.
In Section 3.5 we introduce a more general model to identify su¢ cient conditions under
which intermediation may raise or lower the volume of trade and social welfare. Section
3.6 contains conclusions, and the Appendix collects the proofs of our propositions.
3.2 A Simple Model
Consider an upstream producer (hereafter, called the manufacturer) who supplies his
product to a continuum of perfectly competitive downstream rms in two identical coun-
tries, denoted  and . Downstream rms either manufacturers purchasing an in-
3.9An exception is Blum, Claro and Horstmann (2012) which looks at a matching data set between
exporters in one country (Chile, Argentina) and importers in another country (Columbia, Chile).
3.10There is also a long literature in management science looking at a variety of theoretical aspects linked
to demand uncertainty in distribution channels, intermediation and inventories. Some aspects have sim-
ilarities with our concerns, especially issues such as who should hold inventories and own products once
the demand uncertainty is resolved, the strategic use of inventories, new internet-based distribution chan-
nels such as drop shipping allowing wholesalers to ship products directly to consumers at the retailers
request, shipments to replenish retailersinventories decided and managed by an upstream rm and not
by retailers, the management of risk within a supply chain, and the role of intermediation when the
environment changes. See Belavina and Girotra (2012); Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg (2010), Chen and
Gavirneni (2010) and references herein for recent examples. However this literature has a very di¤erent
focus with respect to this chapter since it deals mainly with issues linked to management strategies. As
a result it mostly deals with static models and does not o¤er insights on international trade issues and
social welfare.
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termediate good or retailers purchasing a nal good in turn sell to consumers. The
manufacturer may sell directly to the downstream rms or sell goods to wholesalers that
then resell to the downstream rms. All market participants are risk neutral.
The markets we consider have three important features. First, nal demand in the
two countries is random. Second, orders have to be placed and goods have to be pro-
duced before demand is known. This time lag between production and consumption, in
combination with demand uncertainty, gives rise to inventory. Third, in addition to the
production lag there may also be a time lag involved in shipping goods between the origin
and the destination countries  and . A su¢ ciently long time lag makes trade lumpy
providing an additional reason for keeping inventory.
We capture the dynamics of inventory holding by assuming that there are two periods,
t = 1; 2, in which production and consumption take place. Production takes place at the
beginning of each period before demand is known. Consumption occurs at the end of
each period. The production lag thus happens within each period. In addition there may
be a trade lag, in which case goods may only be shipped at the beginning of period 1
for consumption in periods 1 and 2; this is the case of lumpy trade. When goods can be
shipped each period, we call this non-lumpy trade.
Demand in country i = ;  at time t = 1; 2 is given by the linear inverse demand
function: pit = A sit+"it, where sit denotes nal sales and pit is the consumer price. The
random variables "it 2 [ d; d] are intertemporally independent, but in each period may
be correlated across the two countries. In particular, for t = 1; 2, let f ("t; "t) denote
the joint density function and assume that the marginal densities are uniform so that
f ("t) =
R d
 d f ("t; "t) d"t  12d and f ("t) =
R d
 d f ("t; "t) d"t  12d . Furthermore,
suppose that ft ("t; "t) 6= f ("t) f ("t), and let the correlation coe¢ cient between "t
and "t be  for t = 1; 2. Markets are spatially and intertemporally segmented so that
there is no consumer arbitrage across space or time. We also rule out parallel trade across
countries by downstream rms.
Our assumptions about the production and distribution technologies are as simple as
possible. The manufacturer incurs a constant unit cost of production c, and wholesal-
ing involves a per-unit cost cw. The marginal production cost of downstream rms is
normalized to zero, as is the trade cost and the cost of holding inventory. There is no
discounting.
In order to simplify the analysis even further, we make the additional assumption
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that the demand shock is not too big:
d  min

2(c+ cw)
3
;
A  c
4
;
A  (c+ cw)
2

: (A3.1)
This assumption rules out situations in which demand is (i) so high that there are stock-
outs in equilibrium, (ii) so low that when competitive rms unload goods at the end of
period 2 the consumer price drops to zero, and (iii) so low in period 1 that trade in period
2 collapses. We discuss later what happens when we drop some of these assumptions.
We let the manufacturer set a two-part tari¤, consisting of a producer price and
a xed payment or transfer. The notation we use is Pit for the producer price and
Tit for the transfer, with i = ;  and t = 1; 2. The two-part tari¤ rules out any
double marginalization if the manufacturer sells through wholesalers. Wholesalers charge
a wholesale price wit; this is without loss of generality, as they would not be able to
demand a positive xed payment from competitive downstream rms that earn zero
prots in equilibrium.
Next we describe the timing of events. We begin with the case in which the manu-
facturer deals directly with the downstream rms (and hence does not use a wholesaler).
If trade is non-lumpy, then at the beginning of period 1 the manufacturer announces a
the two-part tari¤ (Pi1; Ti1). Downstream rms in country i order and take possession
of qi1 units of goods before demand in period 1 is known; then period-one demand is
revealed and the downstream rms sell si1  qi1 in period 1, holding unsold units as
inventory for period 2. In period 2, the manufacturer sets (Pi2; Ti2), and downstream
rms order quantity qi2, again before period-two demand is known. Demand in period
2 is then revealed and downstream rms sell si2  qi2 + (qi1   si1). If trade is lumpy,
then downstream rms may not reorder goods in period 2, but instead order a quantity
Qi in period 1 and sell in period 2 whatever inventory is left over from period 1 so that
si2  Qi   si1.
Now consider the potential role of wholesalers in improving the allocation of goods
across countries and across periods. To distinguish very precisely between export and
import wholesalers we give them distinct roles: an export wholesaler allocates goods
across export destinations; an import wholesaler allocates goods across time in a given
destination market. An export wholesaler thus is a rm that takes possession of goods
in the country of origin and allocates them across the two countries but not across
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periods. Hence, an export wholesaler does not hold any inventory. By contrast an import
wholesaler is a rm that takes possession of goods in the country of destination. There it
may allocate goods across periods by holding inventory. But it does not allocate goods
across countries.3.11 Both types of wholesalers, just like downstream rms, take possession
of goods before the state of demand in a period is revealed. But unlike downstream rms
an export wholesaler is able to allocate goods across countries once demand has become
known. An import wholesaler, like downstream rms, may keep inventory and thus
allocate goods across periods once demand has been revealed.
Recall that the manufacturer sets a two-part tari¤ and it thus able to extract whole-
salersentire prot. The manufacturer has therefore no incentive to use more than one
export wholesaler and, in the case of import wholesalers, more than one in each destina-
tion country.
The timing in the case of an export wholesaler and non-lumpy trade is as follows.
In period 1 after observing the two-part tari¤ (P1; T1) the export wholesaler orders and
takes possession of quantity q1. After demand has been revealed, he sets wholesale prices
w1 and w1 to allocate q1 across countries  and . Downstream rms then sell output
to consumers, where it has to be the case that s1 + s1  q1. In period 2, the export
wholesaler reorders quantity q2 at the producer tari¤ (P2; T2) and resells it to downstream
rms at wholesale prices w2 and w2 so that s2 + s2  q2. In the case of lumpy trade,
the export wholesaler, having ordered Q1 in period 1 can ship goods only once after
observing demand in period 1. That is, he ships Qi1 to country i at wholesale price wi,
where Q1 + Q1  Q1. Downstream rms in country i = ;  then allocate inventory
across periods such that their sales satisfy si1 + si2  Qi1.
An import wholesaler takes over from the downstream rms the inventory holding
across periods; the downstream rms sell in each period whatever they buy from the
wholesaler in that period. Thus, at the beginning of period 1 before demand is known
the import wholesaler in country i orders and takes possession of quantity qi1 paying
the producer tari¤ (Pi1; Ti1); then demand in period 1 is revealed and the wholesaler sets
wholesale price wi1, and downstream rms realize sales of si1  qi1. The import wholesaler
3.11In other words, it is the ability of allocating goods across time that primarily characterizes our
import wholesaler. It does not mean that an import wholesaler could not spatially allocate goods too,
but that this role is secondary and thus ignored here. The same is true for our export wholesaler: the
spatial allocation of goods is seen as the main role and the allocation across time is secondary, and thus
ignored in our analysis.
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may reorder goods in period 2 at the producer tari¤ (Pi2; Ti2). Denote this quantity by
qi2. Finally demand in period 2 is revealed and the wholesaler sets wholesale price wi2
so that the downstream rms sell si2  qi2 + (qi1   si1). In the case of lumpy trade, the
import wholesaler in country i orders a quantity Qi in period 1 before demand in that
period is known. After period-1 demand is revealed, the import wholesaler determines
how much of this quantity to sell to downstream rms in period 1 at wholesale price
wi1 and how much inventory to keep for period 2. The downstream rmssales have to
satisfy si1 + si2  Qi.
In all the cases analyzed below, we assume that the total trade ow over both periods
is strictly equal to total sales. In other words, all the units shipped to a country are
consumed by the end of period 2.
In the next section we derive the equilibrium of this simple model for the case in
which there is only a production lag but no trade lag so that trade is non-lumpy. In
Section 3.4 we consider the case of lumpy trade. Note that our simple model with linear
demand and an additive demand shock has a feature that makes it particularly suitable
to identify circumstances under which manufacturers will export directly, use an export
wholesaler, or use import wholesalers: trade lumpiness has no and intermediation only
a trivial e¤ect on the volume of trade and welfare. Such e¤ects do, however, exist in a
more general model, to which we turn in Section 3.5.
3.3 Equilibrium with Non-Lumpy Trade
3.3.1 Direct Exports
Competitive rms are price-takers and in equilibrium will order goods until their expected
prot is zero. In both countries, the manufacturer therefore charges a zero xed fee Tt = 0
in each period t = 1; 2 (we omit the subscript i for now). Consider then rst what happens
in period 2 in one of the countries. After observing demand the competitive rms will sell
all of the products on hand, and hence s2 = q2 + q1   s1. The competitive downstream
rms order goods before the demand shock is realized; given a producer price P2, their
expected prot is zero when the quantity ordered, q2, satises:
E2 (A  s2 + "2) s2   P2q2 = 0:
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Given this demand from the downstream rms, the expected manufacturer prot in
period 2 is:
E2 (2) = P2q2   cq2
= E2 (A  s2 + "2) s2   c (s1 + s2   q1) :
The prot maximizing expected sales volume is hence s2 = A c2 , and the expected con-
sumer price is E2(p2) = A  s2 = A+c2 .
In period 1, after "1 has been revealed, competitive rms have to decide how much
to sell and how much inventory to keep for period 2. Being price takers they will sell
as long as the price in period 1 exceeds the expected price in period 2, and otherwise
hold goods in inventory for period 2. In equilibrium, the price in period 1 thus satises
p1 = E2(p2) =
A+c
2
.3.12 The rst-period price thus satises
A  s1 + "1 = A+ c
2
;
and therefore s1 = A c2 + "1.
Since the leftover can be stored for next selling period at no cost, it is optimal for the
competitive rms to avoid any possibility of stock-outs by ordering q1 = A c2 + d in the
rst period and q2 = s2   (q1   s1) in period 2. With s2 = A c2 , the order in period 2 is
q2 =
A c
2
+ "1   d and the total order over both periods is q1 + q2 = A   c + "1. These
orders of course also correspond to international trade volumes.
In period 1 the competitive downstream rms expect to earn a total revenue equal
to
R d
 d
A+c
2
(A  c+ "1) 12dd"1. They order an overall quantity such that their expected
prot is zero: Z d
 d
A+ c
2
(A  c+ "1) 1
2d
d"1   P1q1   P2q2 = 0:
3.12Note that, if all of the other competitive rms behave in this way, the best response is also to follow
this strategy for any given individual competitive rm.
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In period 1 the expected manufacturer prot can hence be written as:
P1q1 + P2q2   c (q1 + q2)
=
Z d
 d

A+ c
2
  c

(A  c+ "1) 1
2d
d"1
=
(A  c)2
2
Summing this prot over both destination markets we obtain a total expected manufac-
turer prot from direct trade of
E
 
nldirect

= (A  c)2 : (3.1)
The total expected volume of exports to the two countries is equal to 2 (A  c) but
what is interesting is less the total expected volume of trade than the trade volatility
implied by the model. In other words, we would like to examine how the actual volume
of trade reacts to demand shocks, and thus how volatility in nal demand translates into
volatility in trade.
The key to understanding this connection is to consider how much inventory down-
stream rms hold in period 1 after the shock "1 has been realized and the quantity s1
has been sold. Denoting this inventory level by Idirect1  q1   s1, we have
Idirect1 = d  "1: (3.2)
Exports in period 2 are equal to qdirect2 = s2   Idirect1 so that
qdirect2 =
A  c
2
  (d  "1): (3.3)
Thus a demand shock "1 in period 1 leads to a shock to inventory, and the latter directly
turns into a shock to the volume of trade in the subsequent period.3.13 From (3.3) we can
3.13It is easy to see that this argument does not depend on having only a two-period model. Even in a
setting with more periods downstream rms have an incentive to hold inventory so as to equalize prices
across time. Thus a demand shock in one period will a¤ect trade in the subsequent period in the same
way.
36
compute the variance of trade which is equal to
directq2 =
d2
3
: (3.4)
It is important to keep in mind that the equilibrium level of inventory is determined
by downstream rms incentive to hold inventory so as to equalize the observed rst-
period price to the expected second-period price. As we shall see below, wholesalers face
di¤erent economic incentives to hold inventory than downstream rms and the volatility
of trade will hence be di¤erent in the case of import or export wholesalers.
3.3.2 Import Wholesalers
Suppose that trade is intermediated by import wholesalers, one in each destination coun-
try. We consider one of the countries and drop the country subscript again. Consider the
behavior of the competitive downstream rms in period 2. After demand has been re-
vealed and, given a wholesale pricew2, the competitive rms earn zero prot when they or-
der from the wholesaler and then sell an amount s2 satisfying (A  s2 + "2) s2 w2s2 = 0.
Therefore the expected revenue of the import wholesaler in period 2 is
E2 [(A  s2 + "2) s2] = (A  s2) s2; (3.5)
and the expected marginal revenue is
E (MR2) = A  2s2: (3.6)
To determine the wholesalers optimal sales, assume for the moment that the manufac-
turer charges the same producer price in both periods: P1 = P2 = P ; we argue below that
this is indeed optimal for the manufacturer. Expected second-period sales are then prot-
maximizing for the import wholesaler when his expected marginal revenue is equal to his
marginal cost, which is given by the sum of producer price and the marginal wholesale
cost: P + cw. The optimal level of sales hence is s2 = (A  (P + cw)) =2.
In period 1, after "1 has been revealed, the import wholesaler sets a wholesale price w1
and competitive rms purchase and sell quantity s1, such that (A  s1 + "1) s1 w1s1 = 0.
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The wholesalers revenue hence is equal to
R1 = (A  s1 + "1) s1; (3.7)
and the corresponding marginal revenue is
MR1 = A  2s1 + "1: (3.8)
Equating this marginal revenue with P + cw yields as optimal period 1 sales s1 =
(A  (P + cw) + "1) =2. In order to rule out the possibility of a "stock-out", the import
wholesaler will order q1 = (A  (P + cw) + d) =2 in period 1 and top this up with an
expected order of q2 = s2   (q1   s1) in period 2.
Finally consider the manufacturers problem of choosing P and T . The manufacturer
can set T so as to extract the wholesalers entire expected prot. It is then obviously
optimal for the manufacture to set P = c so as to avoid any double-marginalization
problem. This can be formally shown by nding rst the total expected prot of the
wholesaler for a given producer price P and transfer T to the manufacturer:Z d
 d

A  A  (P + cw) + "1
2
+ "1   (P + cw)

A  (P + cw) + "1
2

1
2d
d"1| {z }
expected revenue in period t=1
+

A  A  (P + cw)
2
  (P + cw)

A  (P + cw)
2

| {z }
expected revenue in period t=2
  T
=
[A  (P + cw)]2
2
+
d2
12
  T ;
and then by solving
max
P
+dR
 d
(P   c)
h
A  (P + cw) + "1
2
i 1
2d
d"1 +
[A  (P + cw)]2
2
+
d2
12
;
max
P
(P   c) [A  (P + cw)] + [A  (P + cw)]
2
2
+
d2
12
:
With P = c, the total expected volume of exports to the two countries is simply
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2[A   (c + cw)]. This means that, with respect to direct exports, the volume of trade is
only trivially a¤ected by having import wholesalers. This is of course a feature of our
simple model, a feature that will remain true in the presence of export wholesalers or of
lumpy trade. However this does not imply that intermediation has only a trivial impact
on the manufacturers expected prot. Indeed the manufacturers expected prot when
trading with the help of an import wholesaler in each of the two destination countries is
given by:
E
 
nlim

= [A  (c+ cw)]2 + d
2
6
: (3.9)
Using an import wholesaler to intermediate trade has the obvious drawback that
the wholesaler has to be compensated in equilibrium for the marginal wholesale cost.
This resource cost of intermediation, cw per unit, has to be weighed against the benet
of intermediation. As compared to direct exports, this benet consists of the import
wholesalers ability to adjust optimally the quantity sold and hence the markup in period
1 after demand has been revealed. The gross benet of using a wholesaler, d2=6, will
exceed the total resource cost of intermediation if the variance of sales and hence d is
su¢ ciently large.
The inventory held by an import wholesaler in period 1 is given by I im1  q1  s1 and
thus by
I im1 =
1
2
(d  "1) ; (3.10)
which is only half as big as the inventory held by downstream rms in the case of direct
exports. This is the outcome of two e¤ects. One is that the rst-period order is smaller
when it is done by an import wholesaler than under direct exports. This is of course
due to the additional resource cost associated with the import wholesaler but this is still
the case even in the absence of this resource cost. The second e¤ect is that the demand
uncertainty has half the marginal impact on sales when they are intermediated by an
import wholesaler than in the case of direct exports. In other words, in the best case
scenario, the entire order is sold in the rst period and these sales are less than they are
under direct exports, while in the worst case scenario, rst period sales are greater than
under direct exports (at least when cw is low enough). This necessarily results in a lower
inventory at the end of the rst period. These e¤ects are chiey due to the fact that an
import wholesaler equalizes marginal revenues across periods, not prices.
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Obviously, this has an impact on the second-period sales and on trade volatility. With
an import wholesaler, the trade volume in period 2 is equal to qim2 = s2   I im1 , or
qim2 =
A  (c+ cw)
2
  1
2
(d  "1): (3.11)
Thus the variance of trade when it is intermediated by an import wholesaler is
imq2 =
d2
12
=
directq2
4
; (3.12)
and thus only a quarter as high as the variance in case of direct exports.
The reason for the lower volatility of trade in the case of import wholesalers is of
course the same as for having a lower level of inventory: an import wholesaler equalizes
marginal revenues across periods. Hence, since overall trade is the same under direct
exports and under import intermediation (at least when cw = 0), an import wholesaler
is able to smooth trade, and to bring smaller variations in sales and inventories than
competitive downstream rms.
3.3.3 Export Wholesaler
Since we have assumed that an export wholesaler allocates goods spatially but not in-
tertemporally, he will allocate all the products in his possession after the demand shocks
have been resolved in each period. There is thus no inventory and analyzing this scenario
is equivalent to considering twice a one-period case. So we omit the time subscript t for
the moment.
Consider an export wholesaler who has taken delivery of a quantity of goods, q, and
has to set wholesale prices so as to allocate this quantity among the two countries such
that s + s = q. Facing a wholesale price wi competitive downstream rms in country
i = ;  will order and sell output until prot is equal to zero: (A  si + "i) si wisi = 0.
The wholesaler hence earns a total revenue in the two countries of
R = (A  s + ") s + (A  s + ") s: (3.13)
To maximize this revenue, the wholesale prices should be set so as to equalize marginal
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revenues across the two countries:
A  2s + " = A  2s + ":
Together with the condition s + s = q, this implies
s =
2q + ("   ")
4
; s =
2q   ("   ")
4
:
Using these values in (3.13) we obtain
R =
8Aq + 4q (" + ")  4q2 + ("   ")2
8
:
Given a producer price P and transfer T , the export wholesalers problem is to choose
q to maximize
Z d
 d
Z d
 d
8Aq + 4q (" + ")  4q2 + ("   ")2
8
f ("; ") d"d"   q (P + cw)  T:
The rst-order condition for this problem yields
q = A  (P + cw) ;
and the expected prot of the export wholesaler is
[A  (P + cw)]2
2
+
Z d
 d
Z d
 d
("   ")2
8
f ("; ") d"d"   T
=
[A  (P + cw)]2
2
+
d2
12
(1  )  T:
Finally the manufacturer has to set P and T , and it is straightforward to see that it is
optimal for him to set P = c and to extract the wholesalers prot by charging a transfer
T =
[A  (c+ cw)]2
2
+
d2
12
(1  ) :
Summing across both periods, the total manufacturer prot when exporting through an
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export wholesaler is therefore
E
 
nlex

= [A  (c+ cw)]2 + d
2
6
(1  ) : (3.14)
The potential advantage of using an export wholesaler clearly consists of his ability to
allocate goods across the two countries after demand has been realized. This advantage,
specically d2 (1  ) =6, is positive as long as demands across the two countries are not
perfectly correlated so that  < 1. And for  < 1 the benet of using an export wholesaler
compared to direct exports exceeds the resource cost of intermediation if the variance of
demand is su¢ ciently large.
Since the export wholesaler does not hold inventory, the trade volatility in period 2
cannot depend on the demand shocks in period 1 and thus exq2 = 0: international trade
is completely shielded from demand shocks.
3.3.4 Intermediation and Trade Volatility with Non-Lumpy Trade
We can now summarize our ndings regarding the manufacturers choice of trade channel
and of the e¤ects of this trade channel on inventory and trade volatility. Our rst result
deals with inventory and trade volatility. We nd:
Proposition 3.1 Trade is more volatile and inventory associated with international trade
is larger in the case of direct exports than when trade is intermediated by an import or
an export wholesaler.
Given that wholesalers reduce trade volatility, it is natural to ask whether the man-
ufacturer will nd it advantageous to use wholesalers to that e¤ect. In other words, is
it in the interest of the manufacturer to use wholesalers when trade would otherwise be
more volatile. The answer is provided in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2 The manufacturer chooses to sell through a wholesaler when the vari-
ance of demand (and thus d) is su¢ ciently large.
Which kind of wholesaler will the manufacturer choose in this case? Comparing the
manufacturers prots from trade through export versus trade through import whole-
salers, we nd:
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Proposition 3.3 Import wholesalers are used when demand is positively correlated across
countries ( > 0). An export wholesaler is used when demand is negatively correlated
across countries ( < 0).
Other papers in trade have examined a manufacturers choice between exporting di-
rectly or indirectly. However, the economic mechanism behind this choice is very di¤erent
from that studied in the existing literature. Whereas direct and indirect exports by man-
ufacturers are typically based on a manufacturer having a di¤erent export technology
with respect to the one used by intermediaries, all the agents in our model have the
same trade technology. Here these e¤ects rest solely on the existence of lags between
production and consumption and on the necessity for a manufacturer to produce and
to sell its products before the demand is known. Even if channeling trade through an
intermediary is costly, it may still be optimal for a manufacturer to use an intermediary
when the demand volatility is su¢ ciently high. It is because an intermediarys incentives
are more closely aligned with those of the manufacturer than the incentives of compet-
itive downstream rms, resulting in a better spatial or intertemporal management of
trade ows and inventories from the manufacturers point of view. This results in higher
prots for the manufacturer and this even if overall trade is not greater (indeed it could
even be smaller) than without intermediaries. An advantage of this approach is that it
makes possible to disentangle the relative role of an import and an export wholesaler,
something that has, to our knowledge, not been considered either in the literature. The
other advantage is its simplicity. We now turn to extensions of the model. We start by
introducing lumpy trade.
3.4 Equilibrium with Lumpy Trade
We concentrate on the similarities and di¤erences relative to the case of non-lumpy
trade.3.14 Consider rst the case of direct exports. Recall that in this scenario the
manufacturer sets a producer price Pi, then competitive rms in each country i = ; 
order quantity Qi. In period 1, demand shock "i1 becomes resolved, competitive rms
decide how much to sell in period 1, and the leftover will be sold in period 2. The key
result is that in our simple model trade lumpiness has no e¤ect on the manufacturers
3.14Detailed derivations of the results for direct exports, trade through import wholesalers, and trade
through an export wholesaler are provided in the Appendix.
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prot. So for the manufacturer the total expected prot from exporting directly to two
countries is
E
 
ldirect

= (A  c)2 : (3.15)
The reason for this is that competitive rms face the same incentives to divide sales
between the two periods, namely to sell in period 1 as long as the rst period price p1
exceeds the expected second-period price E (p2); otherwise, they will hold inventory for
sale in the next period. This implies that the competitive rmsprots are zero for the
same quantity ordered from the manufacturer.
When trade is intermediated by import wholesalers, the incentive to divide sales
across periods is di¤erent. That is, an import wholesaler allocates output across periods
until the marginal revenue in period 1 is equal to expected marginal revenue in period
2. The total expected manufacturers prot from exporting to both countries via import
wholesalers is then
E
 
limp

= [A  (c+ cw)]2 + d
2
12
: (3.16)
Like in the case of non-lumpy trade, an import wholesaler will be used when the
variance of demand is su¢ ciently big relative to the cost of wholesaling. Notice, however,
that the gross benet of import wholesalers, d2=12, is now smaller than in the case of
non-lumpy trade. The reason is, of course, that after observing the rst-period demand
shock the import wholesaler can still adjust sales and the mark-up in period 1, but now
has to do this under the constraint that the marginal revenue in that period has to
equal expected marginal revenue in period 2. In the case of non-lumpy trade the import
wholesaler was free to choose the quantity that maximized rst-period prot without
having to obey this constraint, since it could not only move inventory into the second
but also reorder goods before the start of period 2.
Finally consider trade intermediated by an export wholesaler. The optimal strategy
of the export wholesaler after he has observed the demand shocks "1 and "1 is to set
wholesale prices so that the competitive rms order quantities Q and Q that equalize
marginal revenues in the two countries. Thus the expected prot of the manufacturer is
E
 
lexp

= [A  (c+ cw)]2 + d
2
24
(1  ) : (3.17)
Like in the case of non-lumpy trade, trade through an export wholesaler is protable
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if the variance of demand is large relative to the resource cost of wholesaling, provided
demands in the two countries are not perfectly correlated. The gross benet of using
an export wholesaler is d2 (1  ) =24 and hence only a quarter as big as in the case
of non-lumpy trade. There are two reasons for this: rst, the wholesaler in the case
of lumpy trade has only one opportunity to allocate inventory across countries, namely
after observing demand in period 1, compared with two opportunities in the case of
non-lumpy trade. Second, once the export wholesaler has completed this allocation, the
competitive downstream rms in the two countries face the "wrong" incentives wrong
from the point of view of the manufacturer and of the wholesaler to allocate inventory
across time, namely by selling until the rst-period price is equal to the second-period
price. This intertemporal "misallocation" of inventory does not take place when there is
non-lumpy trade.
It is immediate from the above discussion that trade lumpiness changes the relative
benet of using import compared to export wholesalers. In particular, trade lumpiness
makes import wholesalers more attractive compared to export wholesalers. We may state:
Proposition 3.4 The manufacturer strictly prefers import wholesalers to an export whole-
saler unless demand shocks in the two countries are perfectly negatively correlated ( =
 1).
This is an interesting result because it indicates that lumpy trade penalizes more an
export than an import wholesaler. It is the case because, unlike an import wholesaler,
the export wholesaler loses control of the intertemporal allocation of products once they
are shipped.
A second interesting result comes out of the analysis. We have seen that the benet
of using an import or export wholesaler is lower in the case of lumpy trade than with
non-lumpy trade. That is, they are only used for higher levels of the variance of demand.
The consequence of this is immediate:
Proposition 3.5 Trade lumpiness reduces the likelihood that trade is intermediated by
wholesalers.
In other words, lumpy trade makes direct trade surprisingly more likely to occur and
thus makes inventories more likely to be managed by the downstream rms themselves.
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The reason is clear: a wholesaler, whether on the import or on the export side, is more
constrained with lumpy than with non-lumpy trade and is thus not as useful to a manu-
facturer to manage inventories within a supply chain.
3.5 Welfare E¤ects of Intermediation
Our simple model is useful for exploring the role of wholesalers in managing inventory and
the e¤ect of di¤erent inventory management arrangements (inventory held by downstream
rms versus import wholesalers) on trade volatility. However, the model also has a special
feature, namely that it yields only trivial results regarding the e¤ect of wholesalers on
the volume of trade and on social welfare in the destination countries. In particular,
intermediation only a¤ects the trade volume and social welfare in the destination markets
to the extent that it involves a resource cost.
In this section we show that for more general demand functions or demand shocks
intermediation does a¤ect the volume of trade and social welfare even if we ignore any
resource cost of wholesaling and thus assume that cw = 0. We concentrate on the
comparison between direct exports and indirect trade through import wholesalers only
and we look at two separate cases: one where we keep the additive uncertainty but
we relax the assumption of linear demand, and the other where we replace additive
uncertainty by multiplicative uncertainty.
Regarding the rst case, consider a general demand function in country i = ;  at
time t = 1; 2: pit = pit(sit) + "it, with p0it < 0. We make the following assumption,
ignoring country and time subscripts:
p00(s)  0; p0(s) + sp00(s)  0; p000(s)  0;MR(s) = sp0(s) + p(s) > 0; (A3.2)
MR0(s) = 2p0(s) + sp00(s) < 0;MR00(s) = 3p00(s) + sp000(s)  0;
p00(s) + sp000(s)  s(p00(s))2=p0(s)  0
This assumption is satised, for instance, for linear demand functions. Obviously, the
linear demand case is a specic and extreme case of (A3.2) since it requires some of these
assumptions to be strictly equal to zero.
We can then show the following result:
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Proposition 3.6 Suppose cw = 0, the demand uncertainty is additive, and the demand
satises Assumption (A3.2). Then an import wholesaler reduces the expected volume of
trade and expected social welfare in the destination country relative to direct exports if
trade is non-lumpy, and it increases the expected volume of trade and expected social
welfare in the destination country if trade is lumpy.
Proof: see Appendix.
The result that the trade volume and welfare e¤ects of import wholesalers are sensi-
tive to the degree of trade lumpiness reects the fact that import wholesalers play two
di¤erent roles. First, they allow the manufacturer to better exercise market power in
the destination countries. Specically by delegating pricing to a wholesaler with better
information about the realization of demand permits more exact pricing to extract sur-
plus from consumers. Second, import wholesalers improve the allocation of goods across
time and thus reduce the amount of inventory required to avoid stockouts. The relative
importance of these two roles depends on the lumpiness of trade. In particular, if trade is
non-lumpy, then import wholesalers are able to exploit demand information each period
to optimally exercise market power; the allocation of goods across time is not so impor-
tant, as goods can be reordered in period two. The opposite is true for lumpy trade:
the role in improving the allocation of goods across time now takes center stage, because
goods cannot be reordered in period two; naturally there is less scope to adjust prices to
new demand information.
To drive home the point even more clearly that there is a trade-o¤ between a better
exercise of market power and improved intertemporal allocation of goods, consider the
case of multiplicative demand uncertainty and hence a demand function: pit = "itpit(sit)
with p0it < 0. This type of uncertainty is best interpreted as uncertainty about consumers
willingness to pay. Thus there is uncertainty about consumers tastes and about the
distribution of tastes across markets. In this case, we would expect the price setting role
of import wholesalers to be especially important, as wholesalers are able to adjust prices
after observing consumerswillingness to pay. Delegating pricing to import wholesalers
thus allows the manufacturer to optimally price discriminate across destination markets,
possibly to the detriment of consumers.
The following proposition reveals two things: it shows that the result that an import
wholesaler tends to raise the expected volume of trade carries over to the case of multi-
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plicative demand uncertainty. And it conrms the intuition that import wholesalers may
reduce social welfare even in the case of lumpy trade; a su¢ cient conditions for this is
linear demand:
Proposition 3.7 Suppose that cw = 0, the demand uncertainty is multiplicative, and
trade is lumpy. If demand satises Assumption (A3.2), then an import wholesaler weakly
increases the expected volume of trade relative to direct exports. If demand is linear,
the expected volume of trade is the same in the case of an import wholesaler and in the
case of direct exports, but an import wholesaler decreases expected social welfare in the
destination country.
Proof: see Appendix.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter shows that adding one more agent within a distribution chain in between a
manufacturer and its customers is often an optimal strategy to follow for manufacturers
in an environment where orders must be placed before demand is known. This is the
case even if adding intermediation is costly and may even decrease the overall volume
of sales. This is an important and especially relevant result in an international trade
context as lags between production and consumption, whether because of the nature
of production, the location of that production or the transportation technology, make
them far more prevalent than in a domestic market environment. The benet brought by
intermediation is shown to be especially important when demand volatility is high, as an
intermediary is able to smooth trade and to lower the need to maintain inventories within
a distribution chain with respect to one where such an intermediary is not present. It
is then not surprising that export and import wholesaling continues to be an important
economic activity around the world. In fact a corollary of our results is that during a
dramatic shock such as the trade collapse and rebound of 2008-09, a trade collapse and
the subsequent rebound should be expected to be weaker within a distribution chain that
involves export or import wholesalers than without them.
But we go further. We also show that import and export wholesalers do not play the
same role as far as a manufacturer is concerned. While import wholesalers are partic-
ularly useful whenever intertemporal arbitrage can be exploited, export wholesalers are
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useful when international spatial arbitrage is likely to be present. Interestingly, lumpy
trade, often associated with international transportation lags and relevant in our model
insofar as it a¤ects the ability of having enough products on hand to meet demand during
a sales period, is shown to decrease a manufacturers incentives to channel sales through
an intermediary, whether it is on the import or the export side, but it does more so
with respect to an export wholesaler. That is, lumpy trade leads to less intermediation
in general, and shifts the focus toward import-type intermediation. If this may not be
viewed as particularly surprising, it nevertheless has interesting implications. In particu-
lar, if one accepts the fact that globalizationhas reduced trade lumpiness, for instance,
through the more intensive use of international air transportation, our results suggest
that globalization has created more room, not less, for intermediaries to be active in the
international market place. Moreover, these intermediaries should become more mixed in
terms of export and import wholesaling activities. It is not that a given intermediary nec-
essarily takes on both more export and import activities, or even that in a given industry,
there are more of both types of intermediaries, but simply that by increasing the benet
associated with their use, there is a more widespread use of both types of intermediaries.
The argument that intermediaries are more useful than ever and this even if transport
costs and barriers to trade have come down is not new. In fact Belavina and Girotra
(2012) argue that intermediaries help adapting to a volatile environment even for rms
that are much larger than the intermediaries they typically use.
While testing directly some of the above results and hypotheses is beyond the scope
of this chapter, it is interesting to note that our theoretical results are consistent with the
empirical results about drop-shipping provided by Randall, Netessine and Rudi (2006).
As mentioned earlier, drop-shipping is an arrangement whereby a retailer forwards buyers
orders to a wholesaler who then ships the product from its own inventory. This internet-
based arrangement makes possible for a retailer to avoid holding any inventory.3.15 The
authors then compare this arrangement with one where the retailer is a traditional one
that holds its own inventories. This is a similar structure to ours in so far as a traditional
retailer holding and managing inventories corresponds to our case of direct exports, while
the drop-shipping arrangement corresponds to the case where a wholesaler manages in-
ventories. The authors do nd empirical evidence that retailers who manage their own
3.15See PRWeb (2012) for an example of drop-shipping in an international context.
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inventories (direct exports in our case) face lower demand uncertainty than the retail-
ers who do not (but wholesalers do). This is very much consistent with our result that
using wholesalers as managers of inventories is optimal when there is high demand un-
certainty. They also nd that the greater the number of retailers, the greater the use
of drop-shipping. Although our retailers are perfectly competitive and thus we have no
particular result on that dimension, it is interesting to note that the fundamental reason
why wholesalers might be needed is because retailers, as price takers, do not have the
same incentives as a manufacturer or a wholesaler. In that sense this empirical nding is
also consistent with our theoretical results. Finally, while most drop shipping wholesalers
supplying the U.S. market are still located in the United States, improved logistics has
led to the emergence of large drop shipping wholesalers in China competing successfully
in the U.S. market. This is consistent with the notion that reduced lumpiness of inter-
national trade tends to give a larger role to export as opposed to import wholesalers.
Obviously a lot more needs to be done on the empirical side, especially in the context
of international markets, as intermediation is here to stay and, as we have shown, their
presence a¤ects trade dynamics.
The nal point is about the volume of trade and social welfare. While most of our
results are derived in a simple environment that essentially keeps constant the volume of
trade and social welfare regardless of the presence of intermediaries, we are still able to
relax a few assumptions to show that, in the case of import-wholesalers, the volume of
trade and social welfare can either go up or down depending on product and international
trade characteristics. In particular we show that there is a fundamental trade-o¤between
an e¢ cient intertemporal allocation of products and the exploitation of market power
associated with import wholesalers and that this trade o¤ is inuenced by both the
product characteristics (reected by the shape of the demand and the type of uncertainty
associated with this demand) and the degree of international trade lumpiness. Everything
else being equal, a demand uncertainty reecting uncertainty associated with consumers
willingness to pay in a market, surely a feature more associated with di¤erentiated than
with homogeneous products, tends to push down both the volume of trade and welfare
in the presence of an import-wholesaler as compared to direct exports simply because it
allows the wholesaler to exploit better market power through time than manufacturers
are able to do through direct sales. However, lumpy trade, by itself, tends to limit the
ability to exploit market power as compared to non-lumpy trade simply because an import
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wholesaler is forced to deal with an uncertain intertemporal allocation of products out of
a single shipment.
This rst attempt to uncover the role of import and export wholesalers has revealed
a rich set of results. But it is only a rst step and more work is required both at the the-
oretical and at the empirical level. Indeed the widespread use of intermediaries suggests
that they have an impact at the aggregate level whether it is through the dynamics of
trade, the volume of trade or social welfare.
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4 An Economic Model of the Bullwhip E¤ect
Abstract: This chapter develops a new theoretical model of the bullwhip
e¤ect, where rms engage in prot-maximization pricing and inventory man-
agement. By introducing a trade collapse case, which is ignored in previous
literature, our model shows that a bullwhip e¤ect will be present when de-
mand shocks exhibit strong persistence, and there will be a reverse bullwhip
e¤ect if the persistence of demand shocks is small. In addition, it is shown
that the degree of the bullwhip e¤ect increases as the persistence of demand
shocks goes up. Therefore, this chapter provides a new explanation for why
some industries exhibit a bullwhip e¤ect while others do not.
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4.1 Introduction
Jay Forrester rst introduced the denition of the bullwhip e¤ect in 1961. He character-
ized it as an amplication of demand variability from a downstream site to an upstream
site. Since then, the bullwhip e¤ect has been observed in various companies and indus-
tries and widely discussed in the management literature. Hammond (1994) observes an
amplication of demand variability in the case of Barillas pasta. Procter & Gamble found
that "the diaper orders issued by the distributors have a degree of variability that cannot
be explained by consumer demand uctuations alone. (See Lee et al. 1997, p.546)" At
the industry level, semiconductor and DRAM industries are more volatile than the PC
industry (Terwiesch et al. 2005 and Lee et al. 1997 ). Several recent empirical stud-
ies based on macroeconomic data also show an aggregate bullwhip e¤ect.4.1 The "great
trade collapse" after the Lehman Brother Bankruptcy in global supply chains has been
considered as one of the most remarkable features. One stylized fact is that, compared
with nal goods, intermediates experienced a larger drop followed by a faster rebound in
trade.4.2 The volatility of trade after the Lehman shock is higher for upstream industries
(Zavacka, 2012).
Lee et al. (1997) outline four causes of the bullwhip e¤ect: demand signal processing,
a rationing game, order batching, and price variations. Specially, Zavacka (2012) and Al-
tomonte, Di Mauro, Ottaviano, et al. (2012) point out that the demand signal processing
becomes particularly relevant in context of the 2008-09 trade collapse. When facing a
positive demand shock, the intermediary does not only sell more in the current period to
satisfy the observed demand shock, but it also updates the next period demand forecast
and increases replenishment further in anticipation of higher future demand.
If the story could stop here, it might sound good: we have found and empirically tested
the bullwhip e¤ect, and we know how to interpret it. Unfortunately, some industries do
not exhibit a bullwhip e¤ect. By using industry-level U.S. data, Cachon, Randall et al.
(2007, p.457) nd "wholesale industries exhibit a bullwhip e¤ect, but retail industries
generally do not exhibit the e¤ect, nor do most manufacturing industries." Even Zavacka
4.1See Zavacka, 2012; Altomonte, Di Mauro, Ottaviano, et al. 2012.
4.2In the United States for instance, from July 2008 to February 2009, US real imports and exports
each fell by about 24 %, while manufacturing production fell 12 %. The rebound was equally impressive,
with import and exports expanding about 20% between May 2009 and May 2010, while manufacturing
production rebounded only by 10 % (Alessandrial et al. 2011).
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(2012, p.26) also nds "the volatility of a downstream production stage might exceed the
volatility of its suppliers if the upstream producers operate in networks of chains with
uncorrelated demands. The analysis is limited by a somewhat simplistic inventory rule."
As she argues, she uses an alternative theory to interpret this reverse bullwhip e¤ect
which seems limited and inconsistent with her explanation for the bullwhip e¤ect.
To our knowledge, there is no theoretical model in economics or operations manage-
ment that attempts to give an explanation for why some industries exhibit a bullwhip
e¤ect while others do not. It is then reasonable for us to investigate the underlying ra-
tionale. Particularly, we want to comprehend the exact relationship between a (reverse
or) bullwhip e¤ect and trade collapse. Furthermore, in most the operations management
literature, demand uncertainty is characterized by an exogenous process, for example
Dt = d+Dt 1 +ut. An intermediary does not need to make an optimal pricing decision.
By assuming an exogenous demand process, it might be easy to calculate the variance
of demand in each echelon of the supply chain. It would, however, make readers lose
sight of economic factors driving the intermediariesbehavior. Therefore, not only do we
nd a tractable way of comparing variances, we also develop a new theoretical model of
the bullwhip e¤ect in which the intermediary makes the optimal pricing and inventory
management decisions.4.3
This chapter presents a two-period model to show the existence of a bullwhip e¤ect,
and explains why and where a reverse bullwhip e¤ect may also occur. In period 1,
an intermediary initially takes possession of some inventory. After rst period demand
uncertainty has been resolved, an intermediary sells the product to a downstream nal
market and decides whether and how much to purchase from an upstream producer for
the next period. In period 2, the intermediary will sell all of inventory he holds, i.e.
the leftover at the end of period 1 plus the replenishment. If rst period demand turns
out to be very high, there will be a stockout case: the initial inventory will be sold
out, and the only optimal decision left for the intermediary is how much to reorder for
period 2. If rst period demand is at an intermediate level, the intermediary will set
the prot-maximization wholesale price and decide how much to reorder for period 2.
4.3Kahn (1987) provided a general model, in which the producer needs to make decisions on both
of these two issues. However, because he neglected the non-production case, (analogous to the trade
collapse case in our context), his conclusion has many limitations. See Reagan (1982) for the rigorous
mathematical proof of this issue.
54
If demand in the rst period is very low, the intermediary will not reorder and simply
allocate the inventory he possesses across two periods. We call this the trade collapse
case, and its occurrence is the most critical point in this chapter. In this situation, the
replenishment is constantly equal to zero, whereas the sales in period 1 increase with
the demand (i.e. a higher demand uncertainty leads to more sales in period 1). That
means that in the trade collapse case, the replenishment is less sensitive to the demand
uncertainty than sales; In the other two cases, the replenishment is more sensitive to
the demand uncertainty than sales, as long as the persistence of demand shocks is larger
than zero. This sensitivity analysis can help us to detect the existence of a (reverse)
bullwhip e¤ect4.4, and understand the underlying economics. The model further shows
us that the volatility of orders is increasing, while the volatility of sales is decreasing in
the persistence of the demand shock. The larger the persistence of the demand shock, the
stronger is the inuence of the rst period shock, and the optimal inventory level for the
next period will be more sensitive to the demand shock. However in the trade collapse
case, the intermediary will allocate products across two periods more equally when facing
a larger persistence of the demand shock.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model, and
then provides the equilibrium of the model. Section 4.3 gives an analytical approach to
the bullwhip e¤ect. Section 4.4 concludes. All details of the proofs are provided in the
Appendix.
4.2 A Simple Model
4.2.1 Model Setup
In this section, we develop a simple model in which an intermediary purchases goods
from an upstream producer and then sells them to a downstream nal market.
We are only interested in "additive" and "multiplicative" demand uncertainty, this
means the inverse demand function P (s; ") is in the form of p (s) + " or "p (s), in which
p0s < 0, sp
0
s + p > 0, p
0
s + sp
00
s < 0. The revenue function is R (s; ") = P (s; ")  s. Since
the uncertainty is additive or multiplicative, it is reasonable to assume E [R (s; ")] =
R [s; E (")]. The demand uncertainty may be serially correlated, which means "1 = v1,
4.4One mathematical lemma will be used, see details in section 4.3.
55
"2 =  ("1   v) + v2, where E (vt) = v, and vt is i.i.d.. The cumulative distribution
is F (), the support of this distribution is [vl; vh]. Here we assume the persistence of
demand shock  2 [0; 1].
In period 1, the intermediary initially takes possession of I1 goods. After demand
uncertainty "1 has been resolved, the intermediary sells s1 products to the downstream
nal market and decides whether and how much to purchase from the upstream producer
for the next period, denoted by q1. The contract between the intermediary and the
producer follows the two-part tari¤ form, T = q1h+f , where h is the producer price, and
f is the xed transfer from intermediary to producer. The marginal cost for the producer
is c.
We then distinguish between three cases in period 1. If the intermediary does not order
from the producer, we call it the "trade collapse" case. In this case, the intermediary
observes that "1 is low, and the inventory I1 is relatively large. It is optimal for the
intermediary not to order from the producer, but instead to use the initial inventory to
cover two selling periods. If the intermediary orders from the producer, but he does not
sell all of I1 in the rst period, we call it the "normal" case. In this case, "1 reaches
an intermediate level, and the intermediary cannot use I1 to cover two periods. He has
to order from the producer for the next period. However, "1 is not so high that the
intermediary cannot satisfy the rst period demand by selling all of inventory I1. The
last possibility is that "1 is so high that the intermediary sells all of inventory I1 in period
1, and continues to order from the original producer, we call this the "stockout" case.
In period 2, the demand shock "2 is realized, and the intermediary gets the amount of
q1 goods, then the inventory held by the intermediary is I2 = I1  s1 + q1. No goods will
be left at the end of period 2; the intermediary will sell all of the products he possesses.
The overall strategic interaction can be represented by the following sequential game:
At the beginning of period 1, the intermediary takes possession of I1 goods, then the
demand shock "1 is realized, and the producer provides the two-part tari¤ contract T to
the intermediary. In the next stage, the intermediary makes the optimal decisions on s1
and q1, then one of the three cases classied above occurs. In period 2, the intermediary
sells all of the inventory he holds.
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4.2.2 Equilibrium
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibria of the sequential game and derive how
the intermediary makes optimal pricing and inventory management decisions. Solving
the game backwards, we begin with the optimal inventory level for the intermediary in
period 2 given the "2 and the producer price h, and then move to period 1. We then
investigate the behavior of the intermediary in these three cases: trade collapse, normal
and stockout; and then calculate the two-part tari¤contract T in equilibrium. Eventually,
we show which of the three cases classied above occurs, given I1 and the realized "1.
In period 2, given inventory level I2 held by the intermediary and the realized demand
shock "2 =  ("1   v) + v2, the revenue of the intermediary is R (I2; "2). Therefore,
the expected revenue for the intermediary at the end of period 1 is E [R (I2; "2)] =
R [I2; "1 + (1  ) v].
Then we move to period 1. If the intermediary orders from a producer (in the normal
and stockout case) in period 1, the marginal expected revenue in period 2 should be equal
to h, i.e.
@
@I2
R [I2; "1 + (1  ) v] = h (4.1)
where I2 is the available inventory for the intermediary in period 2. Then we obtain the
so called optimal inventory level Io2 ("1; h; ), which satises equation (4.1). Furthermore,
in the normal case, the revenue for the intermediary in period 1 is R (s1; "1), and the
marginal revenue should be equal to h as well4.5, that is
@
@s1
R (s1; "1) = h (4.2)
We call so1 ("1; h) the optimal sales for period 1, which satises equation (4.2).
We now start to calculate the producer price h in equilibrium. In the stockout case,
actual sales are ss1 = I1, and replenishment is q
s
1 = I
o
2 ("1; h; ). The sum of revenue in
period 1 and the expected revenue in period 2 is
(Rs) = R (I1; "1) +R [I
o
2 ("1; h; ) ; "1 + (1  ) v]
4.5These two rst order conditions follow from the optimality criterion of dynamic programming.
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The producers problem is
max
h
qs1 (h  c)| {z }
revenue minus cost
+ (Rs)  qs1h| {z }
xed transfer from wholesaler
The rst order condition is
@Io2
@h
( c) + @ (R
s)
@Io2
@Io2
@h
= 0
From (4.1) and the fact that R (I1; "1) does not depend on h in the stockout case, we
have @(R
s)
@Io2
= h. The rst order condition can then be simplied as @I
o
2
@h
(h  c) = 0, thus
h = c.
In the normal case, actual sales are sn1 = s
o
1 ("1; h), and replenishment is q
n
1 =
Io2 ("1; h; )   [I1   so1 ("1; h)], in which I1   so1 ("1; h) is the leftover in period t = 1.
The sum of revenue in period 1 and the expected revenue in period 2 is
(Rn) = R [so1 ("1; h) ; "1] +R [I
o
2 ("1; h; ) ; "1 + (1  ) v]
In this case, the producers problem is
max
h
qn1 (h  c) + (Rn)  qn1h
The rst order condition is
@qn1
@h
( c) + @R (s
o
1; "1)
@so1
@so1
@h
+
@R (Io2 ; "1 + (1  ) v)
@Io2
@Io2
@h
= ( c)

@Io2
@h
+
@so1
@h

+
@R (so1; "1)
@so1
@so1
@h
+
@R (Io2 ; "1 + (1  ) v)
@Io2
@Io2
@h
= 0
Combining (4.1) and (4.2), we have
@R(so1;"1)
@so1
=
@R(Io2 ;"1+(1 )v)
@Io2
= h, the rst order
condition can then be simplied as (h  c)

@Io2
@h
+
@so1
@h

= 0, thus h = c.
Therefore, in equilibrium h = c. Plug h = c into (4.1) and (4.2) in equilibrium, we
have two implicit functions of Io2 and s
o
1, from which we can obtain the optimal inventory
level Io2 ("1; c; ) and the optimal sales s
o
1 ("1; c).
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In the trade collapse case, the story is slightly di¤erent. Given "1, the intermediary
allocates the inventory I1 between two periods by equalizing "marginal revenue", which
means
@
@s1
R (sc1; "1) =
@
@s2
R [sc2; "1 + (1  ) v] ; (4.3)
where sc1 + s
c
2 = I1 (4.4)
Let the solution to equations (4.3) and (4.4) be dened by sc1 = s
c
1 (I1; "1; ). In this case,
the replenishment qc1 = 0, the sum of revenue in period t = 1 and the expected revenue
in period t = 2 is
(Rc) = R (sc1; "1) +R [I1   sc1; "1 + (1  ) v]
Here we nish analysis of the three possible cases classied above. Which of the three
cases occurs depends on the quantity of inventory the intermediary possesses I1 and the
realized demand shocks "1. If I1 > Io2 ("1; c; ) + s
o
1 ("1; c), we obtain the trade collapse
case; if I1 < so1 ("1; c), there will be a stockout case. The cut-o¤ values of "1 for these two
cases are "c1 (I1; c; ) and "
s
1 (I1; c), and are respectively determined by
I1 = I
o
2 ("
c
1; c; ) + s
o
1 ("
c
1; c) (4.5)
I1 = s
o
1 ("
s
1; c) (4.6)
We have shown each players (producer and intermediary) optimal behavior in equi-
librium. In the next section, we will look more closely at the (reverse) bullwhip e¤ect.
In order to do that, we need to know the volatility of sales and replenishment. However,
since we make very general assumptions regarding p (s) and F () in this chapter, its
impossible to calculate the variances of sales and replenishment directly. Although used
e¤ectively in other research, the brutal force solution is not recommended; it involves a
tedious calculation, and makes readers lose sight of economic factors driving the interme-
diariesbehavior. Therefore we provide a new method of comparing these two variances
in the next section. This will not only remove di¢ culties in calculating the variances of
functions and make the comparison of them tractable, but also show the mechanism of
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the bullwhip e¤ect.
4.3 The Analytics of the Bullwhip E¤ect and the Reverse Bull-
whip E¤ect
4.3.1 Existence of the Bullwhip E¤ect and the Reverse Bullwhip E¤ect
In this section, we will analyze the so called "bullwhip e¤ect". There are two ways of mea-
suring the (reverse) bullwhip e¤ect: amplication ratio = V ar(q1)
V ar(s1)
and amplication di¤er-
ence = V ar (q1)  V ar (s1). Since the aim of this chapter is to investigate the existence
of (reverse) bullwhip e¤ect, we do not compute this ratio or di¤erence, we just need to
know which one of V ar (q1) and V ar (s1) is larger. We say that there is a bullwhip e¤ect
if V ar (q1) > V ar (s1). In the case of V ar (q1) < V ar (s1), we say that there is a reverse
bullwhip e¤ect. We rst analyze the scenario in which vl < "c1 (I1; c; ) < "
s
1 (I1; c) < vh.
This implies that the three cases introduced in the last section are possible in period 1.
The other scenarios, in which the trade collapse or stockout cases will not exist, will be
discussed at the end of this section. We can write replenishment q1 and sales s1 in period
1 as two piecewise-dened functions of "1,
q1 ("1) =
8><>:
0 if vl < "1  "c1 (I1; c; )
Io2 ("1; c; )  [I1   so1 ("1; c)] if "c1 (I1; c; )  "1  "s1 (I1; c)
Io2 ("1; c; ) if "
s
1 (I1; c)  "1 < vh
(4.7)
and
s1 ("1) =
8><>:
sc1 (I1; "1; ) if vl < "1  "c1 (I1; c; )
so1 ("1; c) if "
c
1 (I1; c; )  "1  "s1 (I1; c)
I1 if "s1 (I1; c)  "1 < vh
(4.8)
The following lemma is a useful tool throughout our analysis. (For a detailed proof,
see J. Gurland, 1976)
Lemma 4.1 Let X be a random variable, and let n, m be continuous functions on R: If
n is monotonically increasing and m monotonically decreasing, then
E [n (X)m (X)]  E [n (X)]E [m (X)]
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If n, m are both monotonically increasing or decreasing, then
E [n (X)m (X)]  E [n (X)]E [m (X)]
Moreover, in both cases, if both functions are strictly monotone, the inequality is strict.
With Lemma 4.1 we can reduce our problem to just analyzing the sales and replenish-
ment sensitivity to the rst period demand shock. Doing so provides two benets. First,
it is mathematically easier than calculating the expectation term in the formula directly.
Second, and more important, by analyzing the sensitivity to demand shock, we can o¤er
a better picture of the underlying mechanism and a deeper understanding of the role of
the intermediary in the bullwhip e¤ect. This can be shown in the following proposition
and its proof.
Proposition 4.1 If  = 0, there is a reverse bullwhip e¤ect; if  = 1, there is a bullwhip
e¤ect.
Proof. Case 1,  = 0: For "1 2 [vl; "c1], we obtain the trade collapse case, and q1 ("1) = 0.
From equation (4.3), s1 is determined by
@
@s1
R (sc1; "1) =
@
@s2
R (sc2; v)
sc1 + s
c
2 = I1
By using the implicit function theorem, we have @s1("1)
@"1
> 0 in this interval and @q1("1)
@"1
= 0.
For "1 2 ["c1; "s1], we have the normal case. s1 = so1 ("1; c) is determined by
@
@s1
R (s1; "1) = c
Using the implicit function theorem again, we have @s1("1)
@"1
> 0 in this interval. The
replenishment is q1 ("1) = Io2 ("1; c; )   [I1   so1 ("1; c)]. From equation (4.1), Io2 ("1; c; )
is determined by
@
@I2
R (I2; v) = c
Obviously, we see that Io2 ("1; c; ) does not depend on the value of "1 if  = 0, i.e.
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@Io2 ("1;c;)
@"1
= 0 in the interval. Therefore @q1("1)
@"1
= 0  
h
0  @s1("1)
@"1
i
= @s1("1)
@"1
> 0 in this
interval.
For "1 2 ["s1; vh], we obtain the stockout case, s1 ("1) = I1 is a constant, and q1 ("1) =
Io2 ("1; c; ). As before we have
@Io2 ("1;c;)
@"1
= 0;if  = 0. Therefore @s1("1)
@"1
= @q1("1)
@"1
= 0 in
this interval.
In sum, 8"1, @s1("1)@"1 
@q1("1)
@"1
 0, and in some non-trivial areas, these inequalities are
strict.
Here we dene a function g (; "1) = q1 ("1) + (1  ) s1 ("1),  2 (0; 1). Easily we
can check that E

@[g(;"1)]
2
@

=
@E[g(;"1)2]
@
; and @
@
E [g (; "1)] = E

@
@
g (; "1)

, then
@
@
V ar [g (; "1)] =
@
@

E

g (; "1)
2  (E [g (; "1)])2	
= E

@
@
[g (; "1)]
2

  2E [g (; "1)] @
@
E [g (; "1)]
= E

2g (; "1)
@
@
g (; "1)

  2E [g (; "1)]E

@
@
g (; "1)

Furthermore,
@
@"1
g (; "1) = 
@
@"1
[q1 ("1)] + (1  ) @
@"1
[s1 ("1)]  0
@
@"1

@
@
g (; "1)

=
@q1 ("1)
@"1
  @s1 ("1)
@"1
 0
and in some non-trivial areas, these two inequalities are strict.
From Lemma 4.1, we know that
E

g (; "1)
@
@
g (; "1)

  E [g (; "1)]E

@
@
g (; "1)

< 0
Thus we prove that @
@
V ar [g (; "1)] < 0, which implies
V ar [g (1; "1)] < V ar [g (0; "1)]
Thus V ar [q1 ("1)] < V ar [s1 ("1)], there is a reverse bullwhip e¤ect.
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Case 2,  = 1: For "1 2 [vl; "c1], q1 ("1) = 0, and s1 ("1) is determined by
@
@s1
R (sc1; "1) =
@
@s2
R (sc2; "1)
sc1 + s
c
2 = I1
Clearly sc1 =
1
2
I1. This means given I1, the rst period sale does not depend on the
realized value of "1. Therefore in this interval,
@q1 ("1)
@"1
=
@s1 ("1)
@"1
= 0
For "1 2 ["c1; "s1], s1 ("1) = so1 ("1; c) is determined by @@s1R (s1; "1) = c, and
@s1("1)
@"1
> 0.
The replenishment is q1 = Io2 ("1; c; )   [I1   so1 ("1; c)], where Io2 ("1; c; ) is determined
by
@
@I2
R (I2; "1) = c
Therefore Io2 ("1; h; ) = s
o
1 ("1; h), and
@q1("1)
@"1
= 2@s1("1)
@"1
> 0 in this interval.
For "1 2 ["s1; vh], s1 ("1) = I1 is a constant, thus @s1("1)@"1 = 0; and q1 ("1) = Io2 ("1; c; ),
where Io2 ("1; c; ) is determined by
@
@I2
R (I2; "1) = c
Thus @q1("1)
@"1
=
@Io2 ("1)
@"1
> 0 = @s1("1)
@"1
in this interval.
Similarly, we have 8"1, @q1("1)@"1 
@s1("1)
@"1
 0, and in some non-trivial areas, these
inequalities are strict. Then we know that, in the case of  = 1,
@
@"1
g (; "1) = 
@
@"1
[q1 ("1)] + (1  ) @
@"1
[s1 ("1)]  0
@
@"1

@
@
g (; "1)

=
@q1 ("1)
@"1
  @s1 ("1)
@"1
 0
and in some nontrivial areas, the inequalities above are strict.
Thus we get @
@
V ar [g (; "1)] > 0, which implies
V ar [g (1; "1)] > V ar [g (0; "1)]
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That is V ar [q1 ("1)] > V ar [s1 ("1)]. Hence there is a bullwhip e¤ect.
Proposition 4.1 tells us that there will be a reverse bullwhip e¤ect if the persistence
of demand shocks is zero and a bullwhip e¤ect will occur when the demand shocks
is persistent. In the case of  = 0, replenishment q1 ("1) will be less sensitive to the
demand shock "1 than sales s1 ("1). The key point is that when the intermediary allocates
inventory across two periods in the trade collapse case, replenishment q1 ("1) is constantly
equal to zero. In the normal and stockout case, the two curves of q1 ("1) and sales s1 ("1)
are parallel if  = 0, because the optimal inventory stock for next period does not depend
on the current demand shock "1, and the intermediary will order one more unit from the
producer for the next period when facing sales of one more unit in the current period4.6,
i.e. there is a one-to-one relationship. Hence overall the volatility of orders is smaller
than the volatility of sales. A reverse bullwhip e¤ect exists.
On the other hand, if  = 1, this means the demand uncertainty shock "1 will last
for two periods. In the trade collapse case, the intermediary will equalize each period
sales given inventory I1, thus sales are equal to 12I1 in each period, and the two curves
of q1 ("1) and s1 ("1) are parallel. However, in the normal and stockout case, the slope
of q1 ("1) is steeper than s1 ("1): as "1 increases, the intermediary does not only satisfy
the observed current demand but also increases replenishment further in anticipation of
higher future demand. This implies that replenishment q1 ("1) will be more sensitive to
the demand shock "1 than sales s1 ("1), and the volatility of orders is larger than the
volatility of sales, i.e. there is a bullwhip e¤ect.
We can illustrate these results by using a linear inverse demand function with additive
demand uncertainty. The inverse demand function is p = 1 s+"; and v = 0, the support
of the distribution is [ d; d]. After the same calculation mentioned in section 4.2, we have
q1 ("1) =
8><>:
0 if "1 < "c1
2 2c+(+1)"1
2
  I1 if "c1 < "1 < "s1
1 c+"1
2
if "s1 < "1
4.6That is why we can use a two-period model to investigate this issue. When we consider this problem
with innite periods dynamic programming model, the mechanism would be same, but only if the value
function of the recursive maximization problem exists.
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and
s1 ("1) =
8><>:
2I1+(1 )"1
4
if "1 < "c1
1 c+"1
2
if "c1 < "1 < "
s
1
I1 if "s1 < "1
in which "c1 =

2
+1

(I1 + c  1), "s1 = 2I1 + c  1. Now let I1 = 0:6 and c = 0:1. In the
following gures4.7, the solid lines are the curves of s1 ("1); the dashed lines are the curves
of q1 ("1). The x   axis represents the value of the resolved "1; the y   axis represents
the volume of sales or replenishment.
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
x
y
Figure 4.1: A reverse bullwhip e¤ect:  = 0
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
x
y
Figure 4.2: A bullwhip e¤ect:  = 1
If  = 0, the solid line is steeper than the dashed line in the trade collapse case, and in
the other two cases, these two lines are paralleled. If  = 1, these two lines are paralleled
in the trade collapse case, and in the other two cases, the dashed line is steeper than the
solid line.
4.7Including the gure used in the next subsection.
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4.3.2 Prevalence of the Bullwhip E¤ect and the Reverse Bullwhip E¤ect
We have shown that in two extreme conditions, namely  = 0 and  = 1, a reverse
bullwhip e¤ect, respectively a bullwhip e¤ect, will occur. It is natural to try to nd a
cuto¤ value , such that there is a reverse bullwhip e¤ect if  < , and a bullwhip e¤ect
is exhibited if  > . Before we start this investigation, however, we rst introduce the
next proposition to help us understand how the persistence of the demand shock a¤ects
the (reverse) bullwhip e¤ect.
Write the marginal revenue functionm (st) = p (st)+stp0 (st), which satisesm0 (st) <
0 andm00 (st) > 0. We make the additional assumption that the marginal revenue function
is log-concave, that is
[m0 (st)]
2  m (st)m00 (st) > 0 (A4.1)
This assumption is satised for linear and other not-so-convex demand functions. We also
assume that if the uncertainty is additive, v = 0; and if the uncertainty is multiplicative4.8,
v = 1, vt 2 [0:5; 2].
Proposition 4.2 Under A4.1, the volatility of orders is increasing, while the volatility
of sales is decreasing in the persistence of the demand shock. That is
@V ar [q1 ("1)]
@
> 0, and
@V ar [s1 ("1)]
@
< 0:
Consequently, the value of V ar[q1("1)]
V ar[s1("1)]
or V ar [q1 ("1)]  V ar [s1 ("1)] is increasing in .
Proof. Step 1: First, we want to show that
@V ar [q1 ("1)]
@
=
@
@

E
 
q21 ("1)
  [E (q1 ("1))]2
=

E

2q1 ("1)
@
@
q1 ("1)

  2E (q1 ("1))E

@
@
q1 ("1)

4.8In this chapter, we are only interested in some su¢ cient conditions to show the following proposition
and the intuition behind it. If the uncertainty is multiplicative, we do not consider the case of vt =2 [0:5; 2].
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In fact4.9,
@
@
E
 
q21 ("1)

=
"s1()Z
"c1()
@
@
[qn1 ("1)]
2 dF (v) + [qn1 ("
s
1 ())]
2 @"
s
1 ()
@
  [qn1 ("c1 ())]2
@"c1 ()
@
+
vhZ
"s1()
@
@
[qs1 ("1)]
2 dF (v)  [qs1 ("s1 ())]2
@"s1 ()
@
The function q21 ("1) is continuous at the points "
c
1 () and "
s
1 (). This implies [q
n
1 ("
c
1 ())]
2 =
0 and [qn1 ("
s
1 ())]
2 = [qs1 ("
s
1 ())]
2, then we have
@
@
E
 
q21 ("1)

=
"s1()Z
"c1()
@
@
[qn1 ("1)]
2 dF (v) +
vhZ
"s1()
@
@
[qs1 ("1)]
2 dF (v)
=
"s1()Z
"c1()
2qn1 ("1)
@
@
qn1 ("1) dF (v) +
vhZ
"s1()
2qs1 ("1)
@
@
qs1 ("1) dF (v)
= E

2q1 ("1)
@
@
q1 ("1)

Similarly, we have
@
@
[E (q1 ("1))]
2 = 2E (q1 ("1))
@
@
E (q1 ("1))
= 2E (q1 ("1))E

@
@
q1 ("1)

Step 2: From (4.7) and (4.8), we have @
@"1
q1 ("1)  0. In the trade collapse case,
@2
@@"1
q1 ("1) = 0; in the stock-out case and the normal case,  has no e¤ect on the rst
4.9From the Leibniz rule: @@x
264 f(x)Z
g(x)
v (x; ") dF (")
375 = f(x)Z
g(x)
@v(x;")
@x dF (")+v [x; f (x)]
@f(x)
@x  v [x; g (x)] @g(x)@x
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period sales s1 ("1), so that
@2
@@"1
q1 ("1) =
@2
@@"1
Io2 ("1; c; ) > 0
(For a detailed proof that @
2
@@"1
Io2 ("1; c; ) > 0, see the Appendix). Hence we prove
that both q1 ("1) and @@q1 ("1) are increasing in "1. Using Lemma 4.1 again, we have
E

q1 ("1)
@
@
q1 ("1)

> E (q1 ("1))E

@
@
q1 ("1)

, then we prove that @V ar[q1("1)]
@
> 0.
With the same method, we can also prove @V ar[s1("1)]
@
< 0. Note again that the rst
period sales s1 ("1) in the normal and the stock-out cases do not depend on the value of
. Here we just need to prove that @
2
@@"1
sc1 (I1; "1; ) < 0 (see the Appendix for a proof).
The key point in this proof is the di¤erent reaction of @I
o
2 ("1;c;)
@"1
and @s
c
1(I1;"1;)
@"1
as 
increases. @I
o
2 ("1;c;)
@"1
increases in response to a greater persistence of the demand shock. As
 increases, the rst period shock has a stronger inuence, and the optimal inventory level
for the next period Io2 will be more sensitive to "1. However in the trade collapse case, the
intermediary will allocate products across two periods more equally when facing a larger
, this is because the larger  is, the smaller is the di¤erence of "1 and "1 + (1  ) v.
From Proposition 4.2, we immediately know that the value of V ar[q1("1)]
V ar[s1("1)]
or V ar [q1 ("1)] 
V ar [s1 ("1)] is increasing in . Combined with Proposition 4.1, we have the following
corollary:
Corollary 4.1 There is a cuto¤ value , such that there is a reverse bullwhip e¤ect if
 < , and a bullwhip e¤ect is exhibited if  > .
The above analysis has three implications. First, it explains theoretically why some
industries exhibit a bullwhip e¤ect while others do not. Second, it predicts that one
empirical test for the bullwhip e¤ect may have di¤erent results when using seasonally
adjusted data instead of monthly data, consistent with ndings from Cachon, Randall
et al. (2007). When the bullwhip e¤ect is evaluated with seasonally adjusted data, the
prevalence of the bullwhip e¤ect is larger. Third, IT advances and other improvements in
supply chain management may fundamentally change the nature of the economy, includ-
ing the persistence of the demand shock; Proposition 4.2 can predict how the bullwhip
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e¤ect will change in the future. This possibility is worth further research.4.10
4.3.3 Discussion
Notice that the discussion above depends on a necessary prerequisite that there is a
possibility of trade collapse case, meaning vl < "c1 (I1; c; ) < "
s
1 (I1; c) < vh. Otherwise
as long as  > 0, replenishment will be always more sensitive to the demand shock than
sales, or geometrically, the slope of q1 ("1) would be always steeper than s1 ("1), thus there
will always be a bullwhip e¤ect. However, if the intermediary faces the possibility of a
trade collapse, there may be no order after "1 has been resolved, and replenishment is
constantly equal to zero. The variance of replenishment may be smaller than the variance
of sales. Therefore we can conclude that one su¢ cient condition4.11 for the bullwhip e¤ect
is that there is no possibility of having a trade collapse case with  > 0.
The range of [vl; vh], the support of the demand shock distribution function, plays
a crucial role. At rst, the support [vl; vh] determines whether there may be a trade
collapse case or not; if a trade collapse case is impossible, then there will be a bullwhip
e¤ect as long as  > 0; if a trade collapse case is possible, then only a large persistence
of demand shock will cause a bullwhip e¤ect.
For example, take the linear inverse demand function with additive demand uncer-
tainty, if the range of [ d; d] is so small that "c1 <  d, there is no possibility of a trade
collapse case, and we nd the slope of q1 ("1) is steeper than s1 ("1) as long as  > 0.
Then a bullwhip e¤ect exists. Otherwise, the trade collapse case is possible, in which the
slope of s1 ("1) is larger than zero as long as  < 1, and a reverse bullwhip e¤ect may
exist.
How do we explain the range of [vl; vh]? In the case of a uniform distribution, a
larger variance of demand shock implies a wider range of support. Therefore we can
say that the more volatile the demand, the larger is the possibility of a trade collapse
case, and the more likely the reverse bullwhip e¤ect is to exist. In the case of a normal
distribution, the support of the distribution is ( 1;1). As the variance of demand shock
increases, the shape of the distribution function is less concentrated, and the probability
4.10A similar idea has been shown in Wen (2005), which provides an alternative explanation for the
reduction of volatility in the U.S. economy since 1984 (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000).
4.11Alternately, we can say that reverse bullwhip e¤ects necessary condition is possibility of a trade
collapse case.
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Figure 4.3: The range of the support determines a (reverse) bullwhip e¤ect
of a trade collapse case will be larger, as well as the likelihood of the reverse bullwhip
e¤ect. Generally speaking, the larger is the volatility of the demand, the greater is
the likelihood that the reverse bullwhip e¤ect will occur. The other research referenced
above4.12misses the point that a trade collapse may cause reverse bullwhip e¤ect. My
model predicts that during a serious crisis, the likelihood of a reverse bullwhip e¤ect will
be larger than usual. One may wonder why the great trade collapse after 2008 is so
interesting, and why the bullwhip e¤ect is ignored before 2008 in the trade literature?
The fact is that when big shocks happened in 2008, the phenomenon that intermediate
goods are more volatile could not be explained by existing economic models, such as the
business cycle, xed cost capacity constraint, etc.. Then some economic models turn to
explain this phenomenon by the operations management method. However, the concept
of the bullwhip e¤ect has been intensively discussed in the management literature, its
not a new way of telling this story.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
The bullwhip e¤ect has received a great deal of attention from economists. Yet theoretical
models are rarely available in the literature, and many empirical ndings cannot be
properly explained by theory. This chapter provides a simple two-period dynamic model
of the bullwhip e¤ect and applies the model to explain why some industries do not exhibit
the bullwhip e¤ect.
The two-period model developed in this chapter is applied to investigate the under-
lying economics of the bullwhip e¤ect. In this model, the intermediary should make the
optimal decisions based on pricing and inventory management. It is shown that the bull-
4.12Alessandria,2010a, 2011;Veronika Zavacka 2012; Ginamarcro Ottaviano 2012
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whip e¤ect will occur if the persistence of demand shocks is large. This result coincides
with Kahn (1987) and Lee et al. (1997). However, this model is the rst to introduce the
"trade collapse" case which is ignored in the literature. In the trade collapse case there
will be a reverse bullwhip e¤ect if the persistence of demand shocks is small. In addition,
this model shows that the volatility ratio, or bullwhip e¤ect, increases as the persistence
of demand shocks goes up. This result has implications for both theoretical and empirical
research, and also predicts how the bullwhip e¤ect will change in the future.
Finally, the mathematical method used in this chapter provides a tractable way of
comparing volatilities. It allows the reader to better understand the mechanism of the
bullwhip e¤ect.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
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= Q [P (Q)  (c 4c)]
@
@4c =
@Q
@4c [P (Q)  (c 4c)] +Q
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P 0 (Q)
@Q
@4c + 1

(A.1)
Note that in equilibrium vi = c   4c, 8i. However, in the conceptional outside option
equilibrium vi = c 4c; i = 1; 2; :::; n m and vn m+1 = c .
From (2:4), Q is determined by
(n m+ 1)P (Q) +QP 0 (Q)  (n m+ 1) (c 4c) = 0 (A.2)
Di¤erentiating (A:2) with respect to 4c,
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Plug (A:3) into (A:1), we have:
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From (2:2) and (2:3), for i = 1; 2; :::; n m, we have Qi = mQm and P (Q)  (c 4c) =
 QiP 0 (Q), in which Q = (n m+ 1)Qi, therefore
(n m+ 1) ([P (Q)  (c 4c)]) =  QP 0 (Q)
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Now we move to outn m+1. In this case, vi = c 4c; i = 1; 2; :::; n m and vn m+1 = c.
That is, in the conceptional equilibrium, the m-retailer uses the old technology c, but the
other independent stores buy the products from the supplier at the wholesale price c.
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Di¤erentiating (2:8) w.r.t. 4c,
@Qout
@4c =  
n m
(n m+ 2)P 0 (Qout) +QoutP 00 (Qout)
Di¤erentiating (2:2) w.r.t. Qout, and consider the term mQm as an entirety.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Obviously  > 0,  > 0 for 8 m  n. By the expression of ,
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Since we have proved E 0 (Q) < 0 in Lemma 2.1, then we have the following inequalities:
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It only remains to prove that lim
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> 0. In order to do this, we need to calculate
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 @Qout
@m
Di¤erentiating (2:7) with respect to m, and treat the term mQoutm as an entirety,
@mQoutm
@m
=  

mQoutm P
00 (Qout) + P 0 (Qout)
P 0 (Qout)

@Qout
@m
=  
"
mQm
Qout
QoutP 00 (Qout) + P 0 (Qout)
P 0 (Qout)
#
@Qout
@m
=

smE
 
Qout
  1 @Qout
@m
(A.9)
and
@sm
@m
=
Qout @mQ
out
m
@m
 mQoutm @Q
out
@m
(Qout)2
=
fQout [smE (Qout)  1]  smQoutg @Qout@m
(Qout)2
=
fsm [E (Qout)  1]  1g
Qout
@Qout
@m
Therefore
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@smQ
out [2  smE (Qout)]
@m
=

2  smE
 
Qout
 
smE
 
Qout
  1 @Qout
@m
  smE
 
Qout
 
sm

E
 
Qout
  1  1	 @Qout
@m
  (sm)2QoutE 0
 
Qout
 @Qout
@m
(A.10)
From equation (2:8),
@Qout
@m
=
P (Qout)  (c 4c)
(n m+ 2)P 0 (Qout) +QoutP 00 (Qout)
=
P(Qout) (c 4c)
P 0(Qout)
n m+ 2  E (Qout)
=
 Qouti
n m+ 2  E (Qout)
=
  (1  sm)Qout
(n m) [n m+ 2  E (Qout)]
in which Qouti is the quantity for independent store i in the outside option equilibrium, i =
1; 2; :::; n m. The second equality comes from the rst order condition for independent
store, which is analogous to (2:3). The last equality follows the fact that
(n m)Qouti + smQout = Qout
Therefore we have

(n m+ 2)  E  Qout (n m) @Qout
@m
=   (1  sm)Qout
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Then  can be simplied as
 =   2  E  Qout smQout 2  smE  Qout
+
  (1  sm)Qout( [2  smE (Qout)] [smE (Qout)  1] smE (Qout) [sm [E (Qout)  1]  1]  (sm)2QoutE 0 (Qout)
)
(A.11)
+ smQ
out

2  smE
 
Qout

E 0
 
Qout
   (1  sm)Qout
[n m+ 2  E (Qout)]

= A
 
Qout

+B
 
Qout

(A.12)
where
A
 
Qout

= (1  sm)Qout
(
[2  smE (Qout)] [1  smE (Qout)]
 smE (Qout) [1 + sm   smE (Qout)]
)
  2  E  Qout smQout 2  smE  Qout
and
B
 
Qout

= (1  sm)Qout (sm)2QoutE 0
 
Qout

  smQ
out [2  smE (Qout)]E 0 (Qout) (1  sm)Qout
[n m+ 2  E (Qout)]
In fact
A (Qout)
Qout
= (1  sm)
(
[2  smE (Qout)] [1  smE (Qout)]
 smE (Qout) [1 + sm   smE (Qout)]
)
  2  E  Qout sm 2  smE  Qout
= 2 + 5s2mE
 
Qout

+ s2mE
 
Qout
2
+ s3mE
 
Qout

  6sm   2smE
 
Qout
  2s3mE  Qout2 (A.13)
When m ! 1, then the m-retailers market share sm < 1n < 1, since c > c  4c. With
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the fact that E (Qout) < 1,
lim
m!1
A (Qout)
Qout
> 2 + 5s2mE
 
Qout

+ s3mE
 
Qout
2
+ s3mE
 
Qout
2
  6sm   2smE
 
Qout
  2s3mE  Qout2
= 2 + 5s2mE
 
Qout
  6sm   2smE  Qout
> 2 + 5s2mE
 
Qout
  6 + 2E (Qout)
n
> 2 + 5s2mE
 
Qout
  8
n
> 0 su¢ ciently, n > 3.
This implies lim
m!1
A (Qout) > 0 if n > 3. When is left is to show lim
m!1
B (Qout) > 0.
lim
m!1
B
 
Qout

= (1  sm) smQoutE 0
 
Qout
 
sm   2  smE (Q
out)
[n+ 1  E (Qout)]

and
sm   2  smE (Q
out)
[n+ 1  E (Qout)] =
smn+ sm   2
[n+ 1  E (Qout)]
<
1 + sm   2
[n+ 1  E (Qout)] < 0
With condition that E 0 (Qout) < 0, then B (Qout) > 0.
Eventually, we haveA.1
lim
m!1
@
@m
> 0 su¢ ciently, if n > 3
A.1Note that in the linear demand case, E (Qout) = E0 (Qout) = 0, then lim
m!1
A(Qout)
Qout = 2   6sm and
lim
m!1
B (Qout) = 0. This means lim
m!1
@
@m > 0 su¢ ciently, if n  3.
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Equilibrium With Lumpy Trade
B.1.1 Direct Export
When demand shock "1 becomes resolved in period 1, the optimal strategy for each
competitive rm is to sell in period 1 as long as the rst period price p1 exceeds the
expected second-period price E (p2); otherwise, it will hold inventory for sale in the next
period. In an equilibrium with competitive rms we hence have p1 = E (p2), or
A  s1 + "1 = E (A  s2 + "2) = A  s2:
Assuming that competitive rms have ordered the quantity Q so that s1 + s2 = Q,
we have s1 = (Q+ "1) =2 and s2 = (Q  "1) =2. The rst-period price (and expected
second-period price) is hence
p = A  s1 + "1 = 2A Q+ "1
2
;
so that the total revenue after observing demand in period 1 is
R = r1 + E1 (r2) = pQ =
(2A Q+ "1)Q
2
: (B.1)
Given consumer price p and producer price P , competitive rms will order goods until
their expected revenue equals cost so that prot is zero:Z d
 d
(2A Q+ "1)Q
2
1
2d
d"1   PQ = 0:
Thus the expected prot of the manufacturer isZ d
 d
(2A Q+ "1)Q
2
1
2d
d"1   cQ:
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Solving the rst-order condition,
1
2d
Z d
 d
2A  2Q+ "1
2
d"1   c = 0;
yields as optimal output Q = A  c.
So for the manufacturer the total expected prot from exporting directly to two
countries is
E
 
ldirect

= (A  c)2 :
B.1.2 Import Wholesaler
As we know from the case of non-lumpy trade, the wholesaler will earn an expected
revenue in period 2 given by (3.5) and revenue (3.7) in period 1. Hence the total expected
revenue of the wholesaler after observing "1 is:
R = (A  s1 + "1) s1 + (A  s2) s2; (B.2)
where s1 + s2 = Q and Q is the initial quantity ordered by the wholesaler.
In period 1, the cost of ordering quantity Q is sunk and, given the revealed demand
shock "1, the import wholesaler allocates output across periods until the marginal rev-
enues in period 1 (given by (3.8)) is equal to expected marginal revenue in period 2 (given
by (3.6)). This means A 2s1+"1 = A 2s2, and since s1+s2 = Q, then s1 = (2Q+ "1) =4
and s2 = (2Q  "1) =4. Using these values in (B.2) we obtain as total expected revenue
of the import wholesaler in period 1
R =
(4A  2Q+ 3"1)
4
(2Q+ "1)
4
+
(4A  2Q+ "1)
4
(2Q  "1)
4
=
4Q (2A+ "1) + "
2
1   4Q2
8
:
Hence, at the beginning of period 1, the import wholesaler chooses Q to maximizeZ d
 d
4Q (2A+ "1) + "
2
1   4Q2
8
1
2d
d"1  Q (P + cw)  T:
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From the rst-order conditionZ d
 d
4 (2A+ "1)  8Q
8
1
2d
d"1   (P + cw) = 0;
we obtain the optimal order quantity Q = A   (P + cw) and a total expected prot of
import wholesaler of
[A  (P + cw)]2
2
+
d2
24
  T:
As in the case of non-lumpy trade the manufacturer sets P = c, and extracts the
wholesalers prot through the transfer T . The total expected manufacturer prot from
exporting to both countries via import wholesalers then is
E
 
limp

= [A  (c+ cw)]2 + d
2
12
:
B.1.3 Export Wholesaler
When facing wholesale price wi, the competitive rms in country i = ;  will order
goods until their expected prot is zero and thus
(2A Qi + "i1)
2
Qi   wiQi = 0
The total revenue that the export wholesaler can generate by selling to the competitive
rms in the two countries then is
R =
(2A Q + "1)
2
Q +
(2A Q + "1)
2
Q; (B.3)
where Q and Q are the quantities of products allocated to countries  and , re-
spectively, and Q + Q = Q. After Q has been allocated, the competitive rms in
each country sell quantity Qi for two periods, and equalize the rst period price and the
expected second-period price as has been discussed in the direct export subsection.
Consider the optimal strategy of the export wholesaler after he has observes the
demand shocks "1 and "1. The export wholesaler sets wholesale prices so that the
competitive rms order quantities Q and Q that equalize marginal revenues in the two
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countries:
2A  2Q + "1 = 2A  2Q + "1
UsingQ+Q = Q, we obtainQ = (2Q+ ("1   "1)) =4 andQb = (2Q  ("1   "1)) =4.
Using these values in (B.3) and taking expectations, the total expected revenue of the
export wholesaler
Z d
 d
Z d
 d
16AQ+ 4Q ("1 + "1)  4Q2 + ("1   "1)2
16
f ("t; "t) d"1d"1: (B.4)
Now note that
Z d
 d
Z d
 d
("1 + "1) f ("t; "t) d"1d"1
=
Z d
 d
Z d
 d
"1f ("t; "t) d"1d"1 +
Z d
 d
Z d
 d
"1f ("t; "t) d"1d"1
=
Z d
 d
"1f ("t) d"1 +
Z d
 d
"1f ("t) d"1
=
Z d
 d
"1
1
2d
d"1 +
Z d
 d
"1
1
2d
d"1 = 0;
and
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Z d
 d
Z d
 d
("1   "1)2 f ("t; "t) d"1d"1
=
Z d
 d
Z d
 d
("1   "1)2
 
"21 + "
2
1   2"1"1

f ("t; "t) d"1d"1
=
Z d
 d
"21
1
2d
d"1 +
Z d
 d
"21
1
2d
d"1   2E ("1"1)
=
2d2
3
  2 [cov ("1; "1) + E ("1)E ("1)]
=
2d2
3
  211
=
2d2
3
(1  ) :
Thus (B.4) reduces to
4AQ Q2
4
+
d2
24
(1  ) :
Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost (P + cw) yields the wholesalers optimal
order Q = 2(A (P + cw)). We can then compute the wholesalers expected prot, which
is
[A  (P + cw)]2 + d
2
24
(1  )  T:
It is again straightforward to show that the manufacturer will optimally choose P = c
and extract the wholesalers prot through the transfer T . Thus the expected prot of
the manufacturer is
E
 
lexp

= [A  (c+ cw)]2 + d
2
24
(1  ) :
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.6
B.2.1 Non-lumpy Trade
At the beginning of period 2, denote the optimal inventory level as Io2 . From the analysis
above, we know that this optimal inventory level should be the same with direct exports
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and trade through an import wholesaler. Io2 is determined by the condition p (I
o
2) +
Io2p
0 (Io2) = c. In period 1 after demand has been revealed, "price equalization" across
periods by downstream rms in the case of direct exports implies sales in period 1,
sdirect1 ("1), such that:
p
 
sdirect1

+ "1 = p (I
o
2) : (B.5)
"Marginal revenue equalization" across periods by an import wholesaler implies rst-
period sales of sim1 ("1), such that
p
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
0  sim1 + "1 = p (Io2) + Io2p0 (Io2) : (B.6)
Note that applying the implicit function theorem to (B.6) we obtain:
@sim1 ("1)
@"1
=   1
2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )
> 0;
and
@2sim1 ("1)
@"21
=    [3p
00 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
000 (sim1 )]
@sim1 ("1)
@"1
[2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )]
2
=   3p
00 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
000 (sim1 )
[2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )]
3 > 0:
The proof now proceeds by proving several lemmas. The rst two lemmas establish the
result that the expected rst-period price is greater in the case of an import wholesaler
than in the case of direct exports.
Lemma B.1 sim1 p
0 (sim1 ) is concave in "1; or equivalently,  sim1 p0 (sim1 ) is convex in "1.
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Proof.
@
@"1

sim1 p
0  sim1  = p0  sim1 + sim1 p00  sim1  @sim1 ("1)@"1
@2
@"21
[sw1 p
0 (sw1 )] =

2p00
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
000  sim1 @sim1@"1
2
+

p0
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
00  sim1  @2sim1@"21
=
2p00 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
000 (sim1 )
[2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )]
2
  [3p
00 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
000 (sim1 )] [p
0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )]
[2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )]
3
=
(
[2p00 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
000 (sim1 )] [2p
0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )]
  [3p00 (sim1 ) + sim1 p000 (sim1 )] [p0 (sim1 ) + sim1 p00 (sim1 )]
)
[2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )]
3
:
=
K (sim1 )
[2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )]
3
where
K (s) =
h
4p0p00 + 2s (p00)2 + 2sp0p000 + s2p00p000
i
 
h
3p0p00 + 3s (p00)2 + sp0p000 + s2p00p000
i
= p0p00   s (p00)2 + sp0p000:
By (A3.2), 0  3p00 (s) + sp000 (s)  s[p00(s)]2
p0(s) + 2p
00 (s),
) p00 + sp000  s (p
00)2
p0
, p0p00   s (p00)2 + sp0p000  0:
Therefore @
2
@"21
[sim1 p
0 (sim1 )] =
1
[2p0(sim1 )+sim1 p00(sim1 )]
3K (sim1 )  0.
Lemma B.2 E [p (sim1 )]  E

p
 
sdirect1

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Proof.
E

p
 
sim1
  E p  sdirect1 
= E

Io2p
0 (Io2)  sim1 p0
 
sim1

= Io2p
0 (Io2)  E

sim1 p
0  sim1 
Note that E ("1) = " = 0, and sim1 (") = I
o
2 . Using Lemma B.1 and Jensens inequality,
B.1
we know that E [ sim1 p0 (sim1 )]   sim1 (") p0 [sim1 (")] =  Io2p0 (Io2). This proves that
E [p (sim1 )]  E

p
 
sdirect1
  0.
The next two lemmas establish that expected rst-period sales are lower with an
import wholesaler than with direct exports.
Lemma B.3 If "1 < 0, then sdirect1 < s
im
1 < I
o
2 ; if "1 > 0, then s
direct
1 > s
im
1 > I
o
2 .
Proof.
p
 
sim1
  p  sdirect1  = p (Io2) + Io2p0 (Io2)  sim1 p0  sim1   p (Io2)
= Io2p
0 (Io2)  sim1 p0
 
sim1

:
In the case of "1 < 0: from (B.6) we know sim1 < I
o
2 . Since by (A3.2), p
0 (s) + sp00 (s) < 0,
we have Io2p
0 (Io2)   sim1 p0 (sim1 ) < 0, and thus sim1 > sdirect1 . Similarly for "1 > 0 we can
prove Io2 < s
im
1 < s
direct
1 .
Lemma B.4 E [sim1 ]  E

sdirect1

Proof. Mean value theorem tells us that for any "1, there is a
 ("1) 2

min
 
sdirect1 ; s
im
1

;max
 
sdirect1 ; s
im
1

such that p0 () =
p(sim1 ) p(sdirect1 )
sim1  sdirect1
. This implies
sim1   sdirect1 =
p (sim1 )  p
 
sdirect1

p0 ()
=
Io2p
0 (Io2)  sim1 p0 (sim1 )
p0 ()
:
B.1If X is a random variable and ' is a convex function, then ' [E (X)]  E [' (X)].
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Note that
d
ds

1
p0 (s)

=   p
00 (s)
[p0 (s)]2
< 0;
and consider two cases: If "1 < 0, then from Lemma B.3, sdirect1 <  < s
im
1 < I
o
2 and
Io2p
0 (Io2)  sim1 p0 (sim1 ) < 0. If "1 > 0, then Lemma B.3 implies Io2 < sim1 <  < sdirect1 and
Io2p
0 (Io2)  sim1 p0 (sim1 ) > 0. Hence in both cases, we have
sim1   sdirect1 =
Io2p
0 (Io2)  sim1 p0 (sim1 )
p0 ()
 I
o
2p
0 (Io2)  sim1 p0 (sim1 )
p0 (Io2)
= Io2  
sim1 p
0 (sim1 )
p0 (Io2)
:
Taking expectations yields
E

sim1   sdirect1
  E Io2   sim1 p0 (sim1 )p0 (Io2)

= Io2  
1
p0 (Io2)
E

sim1 p
0  sim1  :
Since we know from the proof of Lemma B.2 that E [sim1 p
0 (sim1 )]  Io2p0 (Io2), we can state
E

sim1   sdirect1
  Io2   1p0 (Io2)Io2p0 (Io2)
= 0:
Finally note that in our two-period model, sim2 = s
direct
2 and p (s
im
2 ) = p
 
sdirect2

.
Hence Lemmas B.2 and B.4 imply directly that an import wholesaler reduces the expected
volume of trade and consumer surplus relative to direct exports if trade is non-lumpy.
Since the expected prots of the import wholesaler and downstream customers are zero,
social welfare in the destination countries decreases when trade is intermediated by an
import wholesaler.
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B.2.2 Lumpy Trade
Suppose that quantityQ has been delivered to competitive downstream rms or an import
wholesaler, respectively. In period 1 after demand has been revealed, "price equalization"
across periods by downstream rms in the case of direct exports implies sales in period
1, sdirect1 ("1), such that:
p
 
sdirect1

+ "1 = p
 
Q  sdirect1

; (B.7)
where
@sdirect1
@Q
=
p0
 
Q  sdirect1

p0
 
sdirect1

+ p0
 
Q  sdirect1

=
"Marginal revenue equalization" across periods by an import wholesaler implies rst-
period sales of sim1 ("1), such that
p
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
0  sim1 + "1 = p  Q  sim1 +  Q  sim1  p0  Q  sim1  ; (B.8)
where
@sw1
@Q
=
2p0 (Q  sim1 ) + (Q  sim1 ) p00 (Q  sim1 )
2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 ) + 2p0 (Q  sim1 ) + (Q  sim1 ) p00 (Q  sim1 )
=
1
2p0(sim1 )+sim1 p00(sim1 )
2p0(Q sim1 )+(Q sim1 )p00(Q sim1 )
+ 1
=
1
MR0(sim1 )
MR0(sim2 )
+ 1
:
In order to compare the expected volume of trade in the case of direct exports with
that in the case of an import wholesaler, we need to know the sum of marginal revenues
in periods 1 and 2 for a given inventory level Q. Since marginal costs are the same in
both cases, the case with the higher expected total marginal revenue yields the larger
trade volume in equilibrium.
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Using (B.8), the sum of marginal revenues in the case of an import wholesaler is
X
MRim =
@
@Q

p
 
sim1

sim1 + "1s
im
1 +
 
Q  sim1

p
 
Q  sim1

=

p
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
0  sim1 + "1   p  Q  sim1    Q  sim1  p0  Q  sim1  @sim1@Q
+ p
 
Q  sim1

+
 
Q  sim1

p0
 
Q  sim1

=

p
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
0  sim1 + "1 @sim1@Q
+

p
 
Q  sim1

+
 
Q  sim1

p0
 
Q  sim1

1  @s
im
1
@Q

=

MR
 
sim1

+ "1
 @sim1
@Q
+MR
 
sim2

1  @s
im
1
@Q

:
From (B.7) the sum of marginal revenues in the case of direct exports is
X
MRdirect =

p
 
sdirect1

+ sdirect1 p
0  sdirect1 + "1 @sdirect1@Q
+

p
 
Q  sdirect1

+
 
Q  sdirect1

p0
 
Q  sdirect1

1  @s
direct
1
@Q

=

MR
 
sdirect1

+ "1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sdirect2

1  @s
direct
1
@Q

:
We can thus write the di¤erence of the sums of marginal revenues as
 =
X
MRdirect  
X
MRim
= MR
 
sdirect1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sdirect2

1  @s
direct
1
@Q

 MR  sim1  @sim1@Q  MR  sim2 

1  @s
direct
1
@Q

+ "1

@sdirect1
@Q
  @s
im
1
@Q

:
Notice that without any ambiguity we can write

1  @sj1
@Q

=
@sj2
@Q
; j = im; direct.
The following lemma shows that direct exports are more sensitive to demand shocks
than trade intermediated by an import wholesaler.
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Lemma B.5 Given inventory level Q and the resolved demand shock "1 in period 1, if
"1 < 0, then sdirect1 < s
im
1 and s
direct
2 > s
im
2 ; if "1 > 0, then s
direct
1 > s
im
1 and s
direct
2 < s
im
2 ,
where sdirect1 + s
direct
2 = s
im
1 + s
im
2 = Q.
Proof. Using sim2 = Q  sim1 and sdirect2 = Q  sdirect1 , we can rewrite (B.8) as
p
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
0  sim1 + "1 = p  sim2 + sim2 p0  sim2  ;
and
p
 
sdirect1

+ "1 = p
 
sdirect2

:
Then
p
 
sim1
  p  sdirect1  = p  sim2 + sim2 p0  sim2   sim1 p0  sim1   p  sdirect2  = B:
If "1 < 0, then clearly

sdirect1 ; s
im
1
	
< 1
2
Q <

sdirect2 ; s
im
2
	
. Suppose sim1 < s
direct
1 , then
B > 0 and sdirect2 < s
im
2 . But note
B < p
 
sdirect2

+ sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   sim1 p0  sim1   p  sdirect2 
= sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   sim1 p0  sim1 
< 0:
The rst inequality follows MR0 (s) < 0 and sdirect2 < s
im
2 ; the second inequality follows
p0 + sp00 < 0 and sdirect2 > s
im
1 . This means there is a contradiction, and s
direct
1 < s
im
1 .
If "1 > 0, we have

sdirect1 ; s
im
1
	
> 1
2
Q >

sdirect2 ; s
im
2
	
. Suppose sim1 > s
direct
1 , then
B < 0 and sdirect2 > s
im
2 . But
B > p
 
sdirect2

+ sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   sim1 p0  sim1   p  sdirect2 
= sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   sim1 p0  sim1 
> 0:
Hence there is a contradiction, and sdirect1 > s
im
1 .
This lemma is used to prove the following result:
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Lemma B.6
MR
 
sdirect1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sdirect2
 @sdirect2
@Q
MR  sim1  @sdirect1@Q +MR  sim2  @sdirect2@Q ;8"1
Proof. Let sdirectL = min

sdirect1 ; s
direct
2
	
, and sdirectH = max

sdirect1 ; s
direct
2
	
. We may
construct a function   (x) with domain x 2 [0; x], where x = 1
2
Q  sdirectL = sdirectH   12Q,
such that
  (x) = MR

1
2
Q  x

@sdirectL
@Q
+MR

1
2
Q+ x

@sdirectH
@Q
= MR

1
2
Q  x

p0
 
sdirectH

p0
 
sdirectL

+ p0
 
sdirectH

+MR

1
2
Q+ x

p0
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectL

+ p0
 
sdirectH
 :
We want to prove  0 (x)  0, where
 0 (x) = MR0

1
2
Q+ x

p0
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectL

+ p0
 
sdirectH

 MR0

1
2
Q  x

p0
 
sdirectH

p0
 
sdirectL

+ p0
 
sdirectH
 :
Since p0 () < 0, this is equivalent to proving that
MR0

1
2
Q+ x

p0
 
sdirectL
 MR01
2
Q  x

p0
 
sdirectH
  0
We dene  (s) =   sp00(s)
p0(s) as the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve.
Mathematically,  (s) is the convexity of the inverse demand function, and 0 (s)  0.
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Then,
MR0

1
2
Q+ x

p0
 
sdirectL
 MR01
2
Q  x

p0
 
sdirectH

MR0

1
2
Q+ x

p0
 
sdirectL
 MR01
2
Q  x

p0
 
sdirectH

= MR0

1
2
Q+ sdirectH  
1
2
Q

p0
 
sdirectL

 MR0

1
2
Q  1
2
Q+ sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectH

= MR0
 
sdirectH

p0
 
sdirectL
 MR0  sdirectL  p0  sdirectH 
= p0
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectH
 "MR0  sdirectH 
p0
 
sdirectH
   MR0  sdirectL 
p0
 
sdirectL
 #
= p0
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectH
 
2    sdirectH   2 +   sdirectL 
= p0
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectH
 

 
sdirectL
    sdirectH 
 0
The rst inequality comes from MR00 (s)  0 and p0 (s) < 0; the second inequality comes
from 0 (s)  0, which holds since by Assumption (A3.2) we have 2p00 (s) + sp000 (s) 
s[p00(s)]2
p0(s) + p
00 (s). This proves that  0 (x)  0.
Next dene xdirect =
sdirect1   12Q = sdirect2   12Q, and xim = sim1   12Q = sim2   12Q.
From Lemma B.5 we know xdirect > xim.B.2 Since  0 (x)  0 it follows that    xdirect 
  (xim). This implies that MR
 
sdirect1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sdirect2
 @sdirect2
@Q
MR (sim1 ) @s
direct
1
@Q
+
MR (sim2 )
@sdirect2
@Q
.
B.2If "1 < 0, from Lemma B.5, sdirect1 < s
im
1 <
1
2Q < s
im
2 < s
direct
2 , then x
direct = 12Q   sdirect1 =
sdirect2   12Q, xim = 12Q  sim1 = sim2   12Q. The case of "1 > 0 is similar.
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Applying Lemma B.6, we know that
 MR  sim1  @sdirect1@Q +MR  sim2 

1  @s
direct
1
@Q

 MR  sim1  @sim1@Q  MR  sim2 

1  @s
im
1
@Q

+ "1

@sdirect1
@Q
  @s
im
1
@Q

= MR
 
sim1
@sdirect1
@Q
  @s
im
1
@Q

+MR
 
sim2
@sim1
@Q
  @s
direct
1
@Q

+ "1

@sdirect1
@Q
  @s
im
1
@Q

=

MR
 
sim1
 MR  sim2 @sdirect1@Q   @sim1@Q

+ "1

@sdirect1
@Q
  @s
im
1
@Q

=  "1

@sdirect1
@Q
  @s
im
1
@Q

+ "1

@sdirect1
@Q
  @s
im
1
@Q

= 0;
where we have used that fact that (B.8) implies MR (sim1 ) MR (sim2 ) =  "1.
  0 means that, given an inventory level Q, the marginal total revenue is always
smaller when the manufacturer exports directly for any given "1. Thus we know that at
the beginning of period 1 before demand is revealed, the expected total marginal revenue
is smaller in the case of direct exports than in the case where trade is intermediated
by an import wholesaler. Since the manufacturers marginal cost is the same in both
cases, but expected total marginal revenue is greater in the latter case, it follows that
Qdirect  Qim.B.3
Finally we want to show that if Qdirect = Qim = Q, then consumer prices are higher
in the case of direct exports, so that the welfare result goes through. Denote by P j =
p
 
sj1

+ "1 + p
 
sj2

; j = direct; im the sum of rst period price and expected second
period price, given the realized "1 in period 1. Then
P direct   P im = p  sdirect1 + p  sdirect2   p  sim1 + p  sim2  :
Consider a function
 (x) = p

1
2
Q+ x

+ p

1
2
Q  x

:
B.3Here we can easily check that the total revenue function is concave.
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From Lemma B.5 we know that xdirect > xim, where xdirect = 1
2
Q  sdirectL = sdirectH   12Q
and xim = 1
2
Q   simL = simH   12Q. Furthermore 0 (x) = p0
 
1
2
Q+ x
   p0  1
2
Q  x, and
from p00 (s)  0 we know 0 (x)  0. This yields   xdirect   (xim), which means
P direct   P im  0.
Combining the result that Qdirect  Qim with the result that if Qdirect = Qim then
P direct   P im  0 completes the proof that import wholesalers increase social welfare
relative to direct exports if trade is lumpy.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.7
We proceed exactly as in the previous proof for the case of lumpy trade, but now consider
a demand function pit = "itpit(sit) with p0it < 0 satisfying Assumption (A3.2). At the end
we show that linear demand is a su¢ cient condition for the trade volume and welfare
results.
Suppose that quantity Q has been delivered to competitive downstream rms or an
import wholesaler, respectively. In period 1 after demand has been revealed, "price
equalization" across periods by downstream rms in the case of direct exports implies
sales in period 1, sdirect1 ("1), such that:
"1p
 
sdirect1

= p
 
Q  sdirect1

; (B.9)
where
@sdirect1
@Q
=
p0
 
Q  sdirect1

"1p0
 
sdirect1

+ p0
 
Q  sdirect1
 :
"Marginal revenue equalization" across periods by an import wholesaler implies rst-
period sales of sim1 ("1), such that
"1

p
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
0  sim1  = p  Q  sim1 +  Q  sim1  p0  Q  sim1  ; (B.10)
where
@sim1
@Q
=
2p0 (Q  sim1 ) + (Q  sim1 ) p00 (Q  sim1 )
"1 [2p0 (sim1 ) + s
im
1 p
00 (sim1 )] + 2p0 (Q  sim1 ) + (Q  sim1 ) p00 (Q  sim1 )
=
MR0 (sim2 )
"1MR0 (sim1 ) +MR0 (s
im
2 )
:
103
As before, we want to compare
X
MRdirect with
X
MRim. The sum of marginal
revenues when trade is intermediated by an import wholesaler and "1 has been observed
is X
MRim =
@
@Q

"1p
 
sim1
  
sim1

+ p
 
Q  sim1
  
Q  sim1

= "1MR
 
sim1
 @sim1
@Q
+MR
 
sim2

1  @s
im
1
@Q

:
The equivalent expression in the case of direct export is
X
MRdirect = "1MR
 
sdirect1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sdirect2

1  @s
direct
1
@Q

:
Lemma B.7 Given inventory level Q and the resolved demand shock "1 in period 1, if
"1 < 1, then sdirect1 < s
im
1 and s
direct
2 > s
im
2 ; if "1 > 1, then s
direct
1 > s
im
1 and s
direct
2 < s
im
2 ,
where sdirect1 + s
direct
2 = s
im
1 + s
im
2 = Q.
Proof. Note that in this case " = 1. Using sim2 = Q   sim1 and sdirect2 = Q   sdirect1 , we
can rewrite (B.10) as
"1

p
 
sim1

+ sim1 p
0  sim1  = p  sim2 + sim2 p0  sim2 
and (B.9) as
"1p
 
sdirect1

= p
 
sdirect2

:
Then
"1p
 
sim1
  "1p  sdirect1  = p  sim2 + sim2 p0  sim2   "1sim1 p0  sim1   p  sdirect2  = C
If 0 < "1 < 1, we have

sdirect1 ; s
im
1
	
< 1
2
Q <

sdirect2 ; s
im
2
	
. Suppose sim1 < s
direct
1 , then
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C > 0 and sdirect2 < s
im
2 . But note that
C < p
 
sdirect2

+ sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   "1sim1 p0  sim1   p  sdirect2 
= sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   "1sim1 p0  sim1 
< sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   sim1 p0  sim1 
< 0:
The rst inequality follows MR0 (s) < 0 and sdirect2 < s
im
2 ; the second inequality comes
from  sim1 p0 (sim1 ) > 0 and 0 < "1 < 1; the third inequality follows from p0 + sp00 < 0 and
sdirect2 > s
im
1 . This means there is a contradiction, and hence s
direct
1 < s
im
1 .
Similarly, if "1 > 1, we have

sdirect1 ; s
im
1
	
> 1
2
Q >

sdirect2 ; s
im
2
	
. Suppose sim1 > s
direct
1 ,
then C < 0 and sdirect2 > s
im
2 . However, in this case
C > p
 
sdirect2

+ sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   "1sim1 p0  sim1   p  sdirect2 
= sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   "1sim1 p0  sim1 
> sdirect2 p
0  sdirect2   sim1 p0  sim1 
> 0
The rst inequality follows MR0 (s) < 0 and sdirect2 > s
im
2 ; the second inequality comes
from  sim1 p0 (sim1 ) > 0 and "1 > 1; the third inequality follows p0 + sp00 < 0 and sdirect2 <
sim1 . This again means there is a contradiction, and hence s
direct
1 > s
im
1 .
Lemma B.8
"1MR
 
sdirect1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sdirect2
 @sdirect2
@Q
 "1MR
 
sim1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sim2
 @sdirect2
@Q
;8"1
Proof.
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"1MR
 
sdirect1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sdirect2
 @sdirect2
@Q
= "1MR
 
sdirect1
 p0  sdirect2 
"1p0
 
sdirect1

+ p0
 
sdirect2

+MR
 
sdirect2
 "1p0  sdirect1 
"1p0
 
sdirect1

+ p0
 
sdirect2

=
p(sdirect2 )
p(sdirect1 )

MR
 
sdirect1

p0
 
sdirect2

+MR
 
sdirect2

p0
 
sdirect1

"1p0
 
sd1

+ p0
 
sd2

=
p
 
sdirect2
 
MR
 
sdirect1

p0
 
sdirect2

+MR
 
sdirect2

p0
 
sdirect1

p
 
sdirect1
 
"1p0
 
sdirect1

+ p0
 
sdirect2
 ;
where we have used the fact that
p(sdirect2 )
p(sdirect1 )
= "1 from (B.10).
Now dene a function
 (x) = MR

1
2
Q  x

p0
 
sdirectH

+MR

1
2
Q+ x

p0
 
sdirectL

where as before sdirectL = min

sdirect1 ; s
direct
2
	
, and sdirectH = max

sdirect1 ; s
direct
2
	
, and x 
1
2
Q  sdirectL = sdirectH   12Q

= x. This function has the following properties
0 (x) = MR0

1
2
Q+ x

p0
 
sdirectL
 MR01
2
Q  x

p0
 
sdirectH

00 (x) = MR00

1
2
Q+ x

p0
 
sdirectL

+MR00

1
2
Q  x

p0
 
sdirectH
  0:
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It follows that
0 (x)  0 (x)
= MR0
 
sdirectH

p0
 
sdirectL
 MR0  sdirectL  p0  sdirectH 
= p0
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectH
 "MR0  sdirectH 
p0
 
sdirectH
   MR0  sdirectL 
p0
 
sdirectL
 #
= p0
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectH
 
2    sdirectH   2 +   sdirectL 
= p0
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectH
 

 
sdirectL
    sdirectH 
 0
From Lemma B.7, we know that xdirect > xim;where xdirect = 1
2
Q  sdirectL = sdirectH   12Q
and xim = 1
2
Q  simL = simH   12Q. Therefore

 
xdirect

= MR
 
sdirectL

p0
 
sdirectH

+MR
 
sdirectH

p0
 
sdirectL

   xim
= MR
 
simL

p0
 
sdirectH

+MR
 
simH

p0
 
sdirectL

:
Since p
 
sdirect1
 
"1p
0  sdirect1 + p0  sdirect2  < 0, then
p
 
sdirect2


 
xdirect

p
 
sdirect1
 
"1p0
 
sdirect1

+ p0
 
sdirect2
  p  sdirect2  (xim)
p
 
sdirect1
 
"1p0
 
sdirect1

+ p0
 
sdirect2

which implies the desired result that
"1MR
 
sdirect1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sdirect2
 @sdirect2
@Q
 "1MR
 
sim1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sim2
 @sdirect2
@Q
:
Note that "1MR (sim1 ) = MR (s
im
2 ), which follows from (B.10). Combining this equal-
ity with the fact that @s
direct
1
@Q
+
@sdirect2
@Q
=
@sim1
@Q
+
@sim2
@Q
= 1 implies that
"1MR
 
sim1
 @sdirect1
@Q
+MR
 
sim2
 @sdirect2
@Q
= "1MR
 
sim1
 @sim1
@Q
+MR
 
sim2
 @sim2
@Q
: (B.11)
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Using Lemma B.8 and (B.11) establishes that
X
MRdirect <
X
MRim. Following the
same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.6, we know that in expected terms
Qdirect  Qim.
Finally, consider again the case where Qdirect = Qim = Q. Specically consider the
di¤erence between the sums of rst period prices and expected second period prices in
the case of direct exports and the case where an import wholesaler is used
P direct   P im = "1p  sdirect1 + p  sdirect2   "1p  sim1 + p  sim2 
=
"
p
 
sdirect2

p
 
sdirect1
p  sdirect1 + p  sdirect2 
#
 
"
p
 
sdirect2

p
 
sdirect1
p  sim1 + p  sim2 
#
=

2p
 
sdirect2

p
 
sdirect1
  p  sdirect2  p (sim1 )  p (sim2 ) p  sdirect1 
p
 
sdirect1
 :
Dene a function  (x) = p
 
sdirectH

p
 
1
2
Q  x + p  1
2
Q+ x

p
 
sdirectL

, where x  1
2
Q 
sdirectL = s
direct
H   12Q = x. We have
0 (x) = p0

1
2
Q+ x

p
 
sdirectL
  p  sdirectH  p012Q  x

00 (x) = p00

1
2
Q+ x

p
 
sdirectL

+ p
 
sdirectH

p00

1
2
Q  x

 0
so that
0 (x)  0 (x) = p0  sdirectH  p  sdirectL   p  sdirectH  p0  sdirectL 
= p
 
sdirectL

p
 
sdirectH
 "p0  sdirectH 
p
 
sdirectH
   p0  sdirectL 
p
 
sdirectL
 # ;
where
h
p0(s)
p(s)
i0
= p(s)p
00(s) [p0(s)]2
[p(s)]2
.
Now suppose for the moment that p (s) p00 (s) [p0 (s)]2  0, then p
0(sdirectH )
p(sdirectH )
  p
0(sdirectL )
p(sdirectL )

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0, which means 0 (x)  0. In this case we get
P direct   P im = 1
p
 
sdirect1
   xdirect    xim  0:
Since we assumed Qdirect = Qim = Q, an import wholesaler would hence decrease social
welfare relative to the case of direct exports. A su¢ cient condition for both p (s) p00 (s) 
[p0 (s)]2  0 and Qdirect = Qim is for demand to be linear, i.e., to have an inverse demand
function of the form pit = "it (A  sit). In this case p (s) p00 (s)   [p0 (s)]2 =  1 < 0.
Moreover, MR00 (s) = 0 (s) = 0, which according to the proof of Lemma B.8 implies
Qdirect = Qim.
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C Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of @
2
@@"1
Io2 ("
c
1; c; ) > 0
Proof. (a) In the case of multiplicative demand uncertainty, Rt = "tp (st) st, Dene
m (st) = p (st) + stp
0 (st) as the marginal revenue function without uncertainty. From
equation (4.1), we have xm (Io2)   c = 0, where x = "1 + (1  ) v, and v = 1. Note
that "1 2 [0:5; 2] and  2 [0; 1], then x 2 [0:5; 2]. Assume Io2 = g (x) is determined by the
implicit function G (x; Io2) = xm (I
o
2)  c = 0. Then
@Io2
@"1
= g0
@2
@@"1
Io2 = g
0 + g00 ("1   v) = g0 + g00  (x  v)
From the implicit function theorem,
g0 =   G
0
x
G0Io2
=   m (I
o
2)
xm0 (Io2)
   m
xm0
and
g00 =  xm
0 (Io2)m
0 (Io2) g
0  m (Io2) [m0 (Io2) + xm00 (Io2) g0]
[xm0 (Io2)]
2
=  x (m
0)2
   m
xm0
 m m0 + xm00    m
xm0

x2 (m0)2
=   2mm
0 +mm00
 
m
m0

x2 (m0)2
=
2m (m0)2  m2m00
x2 (m0)3
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Therefore
@2
@@"1
Io2 = g
0 + g00 (x  v)
=   m
xm0
+
2m (m0)2  m2m00
x2 (m0)3
(x  1)
=
xm (m0)2   xm2m00   2m (m0)2 +m2m00
x2 (m0)3
=
(x  2)m (m0)2  mm00 m2m00
x2 (m0)3
> 0
(b) In the case of additive demand uncertainty, Rt = [p (st) + "t] st. From equation
(4.1), we have m (Io2) + x  c = 0, where x = "1 + (1  ) v. As proof mentioned in (a),
we assume Io2 = g (x) is determined by the implicit function G (x; I
o
2) = m (I
o
2)+x c = 0.
Then
@2
@@"1
Io2 = g
0 + g00  (x  v)
= g0 + xg00
and
g0 =   G
0
x
G0Io2
=   1
m0 (Io2)
   1
m0
g00 =    [m
00 (Io2) g
0 (x)]
[m0 (Io2)]
2 =  
 m00    1
m0

(m0)2
=   m
00
(m0)3
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Thus
@2
@@"1
Io2 = g
0 + xg00 =   1
m0
  x m
00
(m0)3
=  (m
0)2 + xm00
(m0)3
=  (m
0)2 + (c m)m00
(m0)3
=  (m
0)2  mm00 + cm00
(m0)3
> 0
C.2 Proof of @
2
@@"1
sc1 < 0
Proof. (a) In the case of multiplicative demand uncertainty, we know
"1m (s
c
1) = ["1 + (1  ) v]m (I1   sc1)
Denote x = "1+(1 )v
"1
, we then have the implicit function
G (x; sc1) = m (s
c
1)  xm (I1   sc1) = 0
Assume sc1 = g (x), where g (x) is determined by the implicit function G (x; s
c
1) = 0.
@sc1
@"1
= g0  "1  ["1 + (1  ) v]
"21
= g0    (1  ) v
"21
@2
@@"1
sc1 =
v
"21
g0   (1  ) v
"21
g00 

"1   v
"1

=
v
"21

g0   ("1   v) (1  )
"1
g00

=
v
"21
[g0   (1  x) g00]
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As before
g0 =   G
0
x
G0sc1
=    m (I1   s
c
1)
m0 (sc1) + xm0 (I1   sc1)
=
m (sc2)
m0 (sc1) + xm0 (s
c
2)
and
g00 =
[m0 (sc1) + xm
0 (sc2)] [ m0 (sc2) g0] m (sc2) [m00 (sc1) g0 +m0 (sc2)  xm00 (sc2) g0]
[m0 (sc1) + xm0 (s
c
2)]
2
=
[ 2m0 (sc2)m (sc2)] m (sc2) [m00 (sc1)  xm00 (sc2)]
m(sc2)
m0(sc1)+xm0(sc2)
[m0 (sc1) + xm0 (s
c
2)]
2
=
[ 2m0 (sc2)m (sc2)] [m0 (sc1) + xm0 (sc2)] m2 (sc2) [m00 (sc1)  xm00 (sc2)]
[m0 (sc1) + xm0 (s
c
2)]
3
Therefore
g0   (1  x) g00
=
m (sc2)
[m0 (sc1) + xm0 (s
c
2)]
3
8><>:
[m0 (sc1) + xm
0 (sc2)]
2
+2 (1  x)m0 (sc2) [m0 (sc1) + xm0 (sc2)]
+ (1  x)m (sc2) [m00 (sc1)  xm00 (sc2)]
9>=>;
Note that (1  x)m (sc2) = m (sc2)   xm (sc2) = m (sc2)   m (sc1), and x = "1+(1 )v"1 =
+ (1  ) 1
"1
 + (1  ) 1
0:5
= 2    2 then
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8><>:
[m0 (sc1) + xm
0 (sc2)]
2
+2 (1  x)m0 (sc2) [m0 (sc1) + xm0 (sc2)]
+ (1  x)m (sc2) [m00 (sc1)  xm00 (sc2)]
9>=>;
= m0 (sc1)
2 + x2m0 (sc2)
2 + 2xm0 (sc1)m
0 (sc2)
+ 2 (1  x)m0 (sc1)m0 (sc2) + 2 (1  x)xm0 (sc2)2
+ (1  x)m (sc2)m00 (sc1)  (1  x)xm (sc2)m00 (sc2)
= m0 (sc1)
2 +

x2 + 2 (1  x)xm0 (sc2)2 + 2m0 (sc1)m0 (sc2)
+ [m (sc2) m (sc1)]m00 (sc1)  (1  x)xm (sc2)m00 (sc2)
=

m0 (sc1)
2  m (sc1)m00 (sc1)

+ x

(2  x)m0 (sc2)2   (1  x)m (sc2)m00 (sc2)

+ 2m0 (sc1)m
0 (sc2) +m (s
c
2)m
00 (sc1)
>

m0 (sc1)
2  m (sc1)m00 (sc1)

+ xm (sc2)m
00 (sc2)
+ 2m0 (sc1)m
0 (sc2) +m (s
c
2)m
00 (sc1)
> 0
The rst inequality comes from m0 (sc2)
2 > m (sc2)m
00 (sc2), and 0 < x  2; and the second
inequality follows m0 (sc1)
2 > m (sc1)m
00 (sc1).
Therefore g0   (1  x) g00 < 0, as well as @2
@@"1
sc1 < 0.
(b) In the case of additive demand uncertainty, we haveG (x; sc1) = m (s
c
1) m (I1   sc1)+
x = 0, where x = "1   ["1 + (1  ) v] = (1  ) ("1   v). This implicit function
G (x; sc1) = 0 yields s
c
1 = g (x), then
@sc1
@"1
= g0  (1  )
@2
@@"1
sc1 =  g0   (1  ) ("1   v) g00
=  g0   xg00
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and
g0 =   G
0
x
G0sc1
=   1
m0 (sc1) +m0 (s
c
2)
g00 =
m00 (sc1) g
0  m00 (sc2) g0
[m0 (sc1) +m0 (s
c
2)]
2
=   m
00 (sc1) m00 (sc2)
[m0 (sc1) +m0 (s
c
2)]
3
Then
@2
@@"1
sc1 =  g0   xg00
=
1
m0 (sc1) +m0 (s
c
2)
+
x [m00 (sc1) m00 (sc2)]
[m0 (sc1) +m0 (s
c
2)]
3
=
[m0 (sc1) +m
0 (sc2)]
2 + x [m00 (sc1) m00 (sc2)]
[m0 (sc1) +m0 (s
c
2)]
3
and
[m0 (sc1) +m
0 (sc2)]
2
+ x [m00 (sc1) m00 (sc2)]
= [m0 (sc1) +m
0 (sc2)]
2
+ [m (sc2) m (sc1)] [m00 (sc1) m00 (sc2)]
=

m0 (sc1)
2  m (sc1)m00 (sc1)

+

m0 (sc2)
2  m (sc2)m00 (sc2)

+ 2m0 (sc1)m
0 (sc2) +m (s
c
2)m
00 (sc1) +m (s
c
1)m
00 (sc2)
> 0
Therefore we have @
2
@@"1
sc1 < 0.
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